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Abstract
This thesis introduces a novel technique for the automated analysis of compiled pro-
grams, which is focused on, but not restricted to, pointer safety properties. Our
approach, which we refer to as Symbolic Object Code Analysis (SOCA), employs
bounded symbolic execution, and uses an SMT solver as execution and veriﬁcation
engine. Analysing the object code enables us to bypass limitations of other software
model checkers with respect to the accepted input language, so that analysing code
sections written in inline assembly does not represent a barrier for us. Our tech-
nique is especially designed for programs employing complex heap-allocated data
structures and provides full counterexample paths for each error found. In diﬀer-
ence to other veriﬁcation techniques, our approach requires only a bare minimum
of manual modelling eﬀorts. While generating counterexamples is often impossible
for static analysis techniques due to precision loss in join and widening operations,
traditional model checking requires the manual construction of models or the use of
techniques such as predicate abstraction which do not work well in the presence of
heap-allocated data structures. Hence, symbolic execution is our method of choice
over static analysis and model checking.
We also present the SOCA Veriﬁer as a prototypical implementation of our tech-
nique. We show that the SOCA Veriﬁer performs competitively with state-of-the-art
software model checkers with respect to error detection and false positive rates. De-
spite only employing path-sensitive and heap-aware program slicing, the SOCA Ver-
iﬁer is further shown to scale well in an extensive evaluation using 250 Linux device
drivers. An in-depth case study on the Linux Virtual File System illustrates that the
SOCA technique can be applied to verify program properties beyond pointer safety.
Our evaluation testiﬁes SOCA's suitability as an eﬀective and eﬃcient bug-ﬁnding
tool.
Extended Abstract
A major challenge in validating and verifying complex software systems lies in the
proper analysis of pointer operations: if a program dereferences a pointer pointing
to an invalid memory cell, the program may either crash or behave in an undeﬁned
way. Writing software that is free of such errors is diﬃcult since many pointer safety
problems result in program crashes at later points in program execution. Hence,
the statement causing a memory corruption may not be easily identiﬁable using
conventional testing techniques. On the other hand, automated means of program
analysis and program veriﬁcation either do not cover pointer safety or are often not
applicable due to limitations regarding the programming language a program to be
analysed may be written in.
A major disadvantage of today's software veriﬁcation tools, regarding the ability
to correctly handle pointer operations, results from the tools being restricted to
the analysis of the source code of a given program. Source-code-based tools usually
ignore powerful programming constructs such as pointer arithmetic, pointer aliasing,
function pointers and computed jumps. Furthermore, they suﬀer from not being
able to consider the eﬀects of program components that are not available in the
desired form of source code. Functions linked from libraries and the use of multiple
programming languages including inlined assembly code are common examples to
this. In addition, many pointer safety problems exist because of platform-speciﬁc
and compiler-speciﬁc details such as memory layout, padding between structure
ﬁelds and oﬀsets.
In this thesis we introduce a novel technique for the automated analysis of com-
piled programs, which is focused on, but not restricted to, pointer safety properties.
Our approach, which we refer to as Symbolic Object Code Analysis (SOCA), employs
bounded symbolic execution, and uses an SMT solver as execution and veriﬁcation
engine. Analysing the object code enables us to bypass limitations of other software
model checkers with respect to the accepted input language, so that analysing code
sections written in inline assembly does not represent a barrier for us. Our tech-
nique is especially designed for programs employing complex heap-allocated data
structures and provides full counterexample paths for each error found. In diﬀer-
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ence to other veriﬁcation techniques, our approach requires only a bare minimum of
manual modelling eﬀorts, namely the abstract speciﬁcation of a program's execution
context that symbolically speciﬁes input and initial heap content. While generating
counterexamples is often impossible for static analysis techniques due to precision
loss in join and widening operations, traditional model checking requires the manual
construction of models or the use of techniques such as predicate abstraction which
do not work well in the presence of heap-allocated data structures. Hence, symbolic
execution is our method of choice over static analysis and model checking.
The thesis also introduces the SOCA Veriﬁer as a prototypical implementation of
our technique. Using the Verisec benchmark suite we show that the SOCA Veriﬁer
performs competitively with state-of-the-art software model checkers in respect to
error detection and false positive rates. Despite only employing path-sensitive and
heap-aware program slicing, the SOCA Veriﬁer is further shown to scale well in an
extensive evaluation using 250 Linux device drivers. In an in-depth case study on the
Linux Virtual File System implementation we illustrate that the SOCA technique
can be applied to verify program properties beyond pointer safety. Our evaluation
testiﬁes SOCA's suitability as an eﬀective and eﬃcient bug-ﬁnding tool during the
development of operating system components.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
During the past decades, safety and security of computer programs has become an
increasingly important issue. Indeed, more and more problems arise from the high
complexity of modern software systems and the diﬃculties of locating subtle errors
in them. Common software defects such as buﬀer overﬂows and deadlocks decrease
system's reliability, rendering them unusable as components of dependable systems.
Frequently, these defects also have security implications.
In recent years, automated approaches to discover errors in software components
via runtime checks or source code analysis have been explored. However, a major
challenge in validating and verifying complex software systems remains in the thor-
ough handling of pointer operations. While programming errors related to pointer
safety  e.g. dereferencing null-pointers, buﬀer overﬂows or accessing memory that
has already been deallocated  are a common source of software failures, these er-
rors frequently remain undiscovered until they are exploited in security attacks or
are found by accident. One reason for this is that accessing invalid pointers often
results in memory corruption, which may lead to undeﬁned behaviour or program
crashes at later points in program execution. Hence, the statement causing such
an error may not be easily identiﬁable using conventional testing techniques. How-
ever, automated means of program analysis and program veriﬁcation either do not
cover pointer safety or are often not applicable due to limitations regarding the
programming language a program to be analysed may be written in.
Especially in the development of operating system components such as device
drivers, memory safety problems have disastrous consequences. They render all
application level programs relying on the operating system unsafe and give way to
serious security problems. Recent literature shows that a majority of all errors found
in device drivers are related to memory safety issues [Chou et al., 2001]. Despite
being relatively small in size, device drivers represent an interesting challenge as
they implement hardware access and are usually written in a mixture of C code and
inlined assembly. This combination makes them particularly hard to test and to
Introduction 12
analyse with currently available testing and veriﬁcation tools.
A big disadvantage of today's veriﬁcation tools regarding the ability to analyse
operating system components for pointer safety issues results mainly from being
restricted to the analysis of a program's source code. Source-code-based tools usually
ignore powerful programming constructs such as pointer arithmetic, pointer aliasing,
function pointers and computed jumps. Furthermore these tools suﬀer from not
being able to consider the eﬀects of program components that are not available
in the desired form of source code. Functions linked from libraries and the use of
multiple programming languages including inlined-assembly are a common examples
for this. In addition, many memory safety problems exist because of platform-
speciﬁc and compiler-speciﬁc details such as the memory-layout, padding between
structure ﬁelds and oﬀsets [Balakrishnan et al., 2008]. Thus, software model checking
tools such as SLAM/SDV [Ball and Rajamani, 2001] and others assume either that
the program under consideration does not have wild pointers [Ball et al., 2006]
or, as we explain in Chapter 3 along the lines of a case study on Blast [Henzinger
et al., 2002a], perform poorly for memory safety issues. We also show that these tools
usually require substantial manual simpliﬁcation of the source code of a program to
be analysed in order to work around unsupported language features. Hence, many
available tools are hard to use by practitioners during software development.
1.1 Defects in Operating Systems
Due to their complicated task of managing a system's physical resources, operating
systems are diﬃcult to develop and even more diﬃcult to debug. As recent publica-
tions show, most defects causing operating systems to crash are not in the system's
kernel but in the large number of operating system extensions available [Chou et al.,
2001; Swift et al., 2005]. In Windows XP, for example, 85% of reported failures are
caused by errors in device drivers [Ball, 2005]. As [Chou et al., 2001] explains, the
situation is similar for Linux and FreeBSD. Error rates reported for device drivers
are up to seven times higher than error rates stated for the core components of
these operating systems. However, errors in kernel extensions such as device drivers
aﬀect the whole operating system and hence have deep impact on the reliability of
programs at application level.
There are several reasons for the high number of errors in device drivers. Firstly,
a device driver is a nondeterministic reactive system. It continuously responds to dif-
ferent events, e.g., user requests and hardware interrupts. For these events, neither
order nor time of occurrence are predictable in advance. Furthermore, operating
systems are often required to provide timely responses to events. To do this, drivers
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must be able to run in a preemptive operating system kernel where the driver's
normal operation may be interrupted at any time [Corbet et al., 2005].
Secondly, and as pointed out in [Ball, 2005], drivers run in a highly concurrent
environment provided by the operating system. This concurrency is exposed to the
driver programmer, who needs to take reasonable means of resource locking in order
to enable the driver to safely deal with concurrent calls of its functions. Concurrent
operating systems are running in two or more simultaneous threads of control. While
these threads perform sequential operations, they dynamically depend on each other
and access the same physical resources, often resulting in race conditions.
Thirdly, device drivers are frequently written by developers who are less experi-
enced in using the kernel's interface than those who built the operating system itself
[Swift et al., 2005]. As a result, driver developers tend to be unaware of side-eﬀects
of the kernel's Application Programming Interface (API), and thereby introduce
subtle errors that break the operating system's safety and security, and that are
often diﬃcult to locate. All this renders driver development rather diﬃcult.
The current practice of ﬁnding memory safety related bugs in device driver devel-
opment is debugging and testing. However, the state-of-the-art in research on soft-
ware development lies in veriﬁcation techniques such as static analysis and software
model checking. By having the potential of being exhaustive and fully automatic,
these methods allow errors to be detected early, with reduced eﬀort, and provide a
high level of conﬁdence in the safety of a program with respect to a given property.
1.2 This Thesis
This thesis deals with the problem of ﬁnding software defects related to pointer
safety in computer programs. By the term pointer safety we mean that a given
program does not violate basic safety rules of the involved programming interfaces
by de-referencing invalid pointers, exceeding boundaries of memory structures or
calling de-allocation functions in an erroneous context.
In Chapter 3 we evaluate, via case studies and from a practitioner's point of view,
the utility of the popular software model checker Blast for revealing errors in Linux
kernel code. The emphasis is on memory safety in and locking behaviour of device
drivers. Our case studies show that, while Blast's abstraction and reﬁnement
techniques are eﬃcient and powerful, the tool has deﬁciencies regarding usability
and support for analysing pointers. These limitations are likely to prevent kernel
developers from using Blast.
Motivated by the case study on Blast, we present a novel approach to iden-
tifying violations of pointer safety properties in compiled programs in Chapter 4.
Introduction 14
Our research hypothesis is that symbolic execution of object code programs is a
feasible veriﬁcation technique with respect to pointer safety properties. Our tech-
nique, Symbolic Object Code Analysis (SOCA), is based on bounded path-sensitive
symbolic execution of compiled and linked programs. More precisely, we translate
a given program path-wise into systems of bit-vector constraint that leave the in-
put to the program largely unspeciﬁed. The analysis has to be bounded since the
total number of paths as well as the number of instructions per path is potentially
inﬁnite. In order to deal with the vast amount of instructions available in today's
CPUs, we decided to base our analysis on an intermediate representation borrowed
from the Valgrind binary instrumentation framework [Nethercote and Fitzhardinge,
2004]. We employ the Yices SMT solver [Dutertre and de Moura, 2006] to check the
satisﬁability of the generated constraints systems. Our approach allows us to express
a range of memory safety properties as simple assertions on constraint systems. In
contrast to other methods for ﬁnding pointer safety violations, our technique does
not employ program abstraction. The program's input and initial heap content is
initially left unspeciﬁed in order to allow the SMT solver to search for inputs that
will drive the program into an error state.
For evaluating our work, we present a prototypical implementation of the SOCA
technique for programs in ELF format [Tool Interface Standards (TIS) Committee,
1995] compiled for the 32-bit Intel Architecture (IA32, [Intel Corporation, 2009]),
which we apply to the Verisec benchmark suite [Ku et al., 2007]. As we explain
in Section 4.5.2, Verisec consists of 298 test cases for buﬀer overﬂow vulnerabilities
taken from various open source programs. Our results show that the SOCA Veriﬁer
performs competitively with state-of-the-art software model checkers with respect
to error detection and false positive rates.
We chose Linux device drivers as our application domain for large-scale evalua-
tion of the SOCA Veriﬁer. The Linux operating system kernel consists of a freely
available, large and complex code base implementing key tasks such as process man-
agement, memory management, ﬁle system access, device control and networking for
about 20 diﬀerent computer architectures. It features a relatively small monolithic
core of components such as the scheduler and the memory management subsystem.
However, the majority of its functionality is implemented in terms of kernel modules
or device drivers that can be built separately from the kernel and loaded at run-
time. These modular components of the Linux kernel are responsible, for example,
for making a particular physical device attached to the computer respond to a well-
deﬁned internal programming interface. Hence, user access to this device can be
performed by means of standardised functions, the System Call Interface, which are
independent of the particular driver or device. Kernel modules amount to roughly
Introduction 15
two-thirds (≈200 MBytes of code) of the entire Linux kernel distribution.
We present the results of an extensive case study on applying the SOCA Veriﬁer
to 9296 functions taken from 250 device drivers compiled for IA32, which is the
hardware platform for which the majority of drivers of recent Linux kernel distribu-
tions can be compiled. By being able to successfully analyse 95% of this sample of
functions and revealing a total of 887 program locations at which a null-pointer may
be dereferenced, our experimental results show that the SOCA Veriﬁer scales well
for that particular application domain. Our bounded symbolic analysis approach is
even able to achieve exhaustiveness for 27.8% of the sample, while for the remaining
functions it was possible to perform the analysis until bounds were exhausted.
In Chapter 5 we present a case study on retrospective veriﬁcation of the Linux
Virtual File System (VFS). Since VFS maintains dynamic data structures and is
written in a mixture of C and inlined assembly, modern software model checkers
cannot be applied. We demonstrate that the SOCA technique can be utilised to
check for violations of API usage rules regarding commonly used locking mechanisms
of the Linux kernel. Despite not considering concurrent executions of the VFS
functions, we demonstrate that our technique can be applied to check program
properties clearly beyond pointer safety issues. Our results show that the SOCA
Veriﬁer is capable of reliably and eﬃciently analysing complex operating system
components such as the Linux VFS, thereby going beyond traditional testing tools
and into semantic niches that current software model checkers do not reach. This
testiﬁes the SOCA Veriﬁer's suitability as an eﬀective and eﬃcient bug-ﬁnding tool
during the development of operating system components.
The thesis is summarised and concluded in Chapter 6. We also outline open
issues and future work in this chapter.
Chapter 2
Background and
Related Work
In this chapter we outline open issues, ongoing research, techniques and tools for the
analysis of computer programs. We centre on the veriﬁcation and testing of pointer
programs, especially operating system components, alias analysis, software model
checking and abstraction techniques.
2.1 Common Defects in
Operating Systems
There are a large number of commonly found operating system errors. An insightful
study on this topic has been published in [Chou et al., 2001]; see Table 2.1 for a
summary of its results. The authors of [Chou et al., 2001] highlight that most errors
are related to problems causing either deadlock conditions or driving the system
into undeﬁned states by de-referencing invalid pointers. While problems resulting
in deadlock conditions are well covered by several formal software engineering tools
such as SLAM/SDV [Ball and Rajamani, 2001], an industry strength software model
checker for Microsoft Windows device drivers, memory safety remains a major is-
sue. Likewise our case study on the Blast software veriﬁcation tool (Blast, cf.
Chapter 3) comes to the result that this state-of-the-art veriﬁcation toolkit does not
cover pointer and memory safety in full.
Although memory safety problems have a direct impact on an operating system's
reliability, API safety rules for operating system kernels are usually described in an
informal way. For example, it is stated in the Linux device driver handbook [Corbet
et al., 2005, p. 61] that one should never pass anything to kfree that was not
obtained from kmalloc since, otherwise, the system may behave in an undeﬁned
way. As a result of this, an exhaustive set of safety rules that can be used as
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% of Bugs Rule checked
63.1% Bugs related to memory safety
38.1% Check potentially NULL pointers returned from routines.
9.9% Do not allocate large stack variables (> 1K) on the ﬁxed-size kernel
stack.
6.7% Do not make inconsistent assumptions about whether a pointer is
NULL.
5.3% Always check bounds of array indices and loop bounds derived
from user data.
1.7% Do not use freed memory.
1.1% Do not leak memory by updating pointers with potentially NULL
realloc return values.
0.3% Allocate enough memory to hold the type for which you are allo-
cating.
33.7% Bugs related to locking behaviour
28.6% To avoid deadlock, do not call blocking functions with interrupts
disabled or a spinlock held.
2.6% Restore disabled interrupts.
2.5% Release acquired locks; do not double-acquire locks.
3.1% Miscellaneous bugs
2.4% Do not use ﬂoating point in the kernel.
0.7% Do not de-reference user pointers.
Table 2.1: Results of an empirical study of operating system errors [Chou et al.,
2001]
properties in static program veriﬁcation is hard to identify. Nevertheless, analysis
techniques such as [Engler et al., 2000] have been applied to open-source operating
systems, identifying hundreds of bugs related to memory safety based on restricted
sets of such rules.
Correct locking of resources is another major issue causing problems in operating
system code. As shown in [Chou et al., 2001], deﬁciencies resulting in deadlocks in
the Linux and BSD kernels make up a large amount of the overall number of errors
found. In the documentation explaining the API of the Linux kernel, quite strict
rules about the proper use of functions to lock various resources are stated. For
example, in [Corbet et al., 2005, p.121], one of the most basic rules is given as
follows: Neither semaphores nor spinlocks allow a lock holder to acquire the lock
a second time; should you attempt to do so, things simply hang. The rational for
this lies in the functionality provided by spinlocks: a kernel thread holding a lock is
spinning on one CPU and cannot be preempted until the lock is released. Another
important rule is that any code holding a spinlock cannot relinquish the processor
for anything except for serving interrupts; especially, the thread must never sleep
because the lock might never be released in this case [Corbet et al., 2005, p.118].
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2.2 Finding Bugs in Device Drivers
The problem of locating programming errors in device drivers is mainly addressed in
testing. However, there are two main diﬃculties that limit a driver's testability. As
Ball et al. state in [Ball et al., 2006], these are related to the restricted observability
inside operating system kernels and to the limited chances of achieving a high test
coverage using traditional testing techniques. Ball et al. point out that, for example,
the Windows operating system provides several diﬀerent kernel-level programming
interfaces, which gives rise to many ways in which a driver can misuse these APIs.
Most of the Application Programming Interface violations do rarely result in imme-
diate failures but leave the operating system in an inconsistent state. This may be
a crash or improper behaviour at a later time, mostly without revealing the source
of the error.
2.2.1 Runtime analysis
While popular runtime analysis tools that target memory safety problems are mainly
available for the development of software at the application level, the large domain
of operating system kernels and device drivers is rarely covered. Toolkits such as
Purify [Purify, 2009] and Valgrind [Valgrind, 2009] provide debugger-like runtime
environments that observe the memory access of an application program under con-
sideration. While these tools can deal with concurrency issues and unbounded allo-
cations, they are not meant for automatic and exhaustive code inspection: In order
to ﬁnd problems, the program needs to be run with a set of test cases or tested
manually. This results in the fact that erroneous program behaviour may not be
revealed due to a lack of coverage. Furthermore, the use of the extensive proﬁling
support slows program execution down by a factor between 20 and 100. Also the
Electric Fence [Perens, 2009] library provides an additional runtime environment by
linking a program against it. Electric Fence replaces standard functions for allo-
cation and de-allocation with customised versions that perform additional runtime
checks.
On the kernel level, tools such as kmdb [KMDB, 2009] for Solaris or the Nov-
ell Linux Kernel Debugger [NLKD, 2008] provide an extensive analysis and testing
framework for software development. As for the above tools, they are neither auto-
matic nor exhaustive.
The major advantages of debugging tools lie in their relative eﬃciency and the
fact that they are not operating on a program's source code but directly on the
compiled object code. Therefore, testing tools perform better for detecting faults
that are closely related to the actual architecture. However, due to the lack of
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exhaustiveness, results obtained from software testing are not as strong as those
gained from more formal veriﬁcation approaches such as software model checking
[Clarke et al., 2000]. Formal veriﬁcation can establish a much higher conﬁdence
in a program under consideration by assuring that a certain property holds for all
possible executions.
2.3 Static Analysis and
Software Model Checking
Static analysis is a powerful technique for inspecting source code for bugs. Indeed,
hundreds of bugs related to memory safety and erroneous locking behaviour had been
detected in Linux device drivers via an approach based on system-speciﬁc compiler
extensions, known as meta-level compilation [Engler et al., 2000]. This method is
implemented in the tool Coverity [Coverity, Inc.] and was used in an extensive
study on operating system errors [Chou et al., 2001]. Also most of the examples for
memory safety bugs in the Linux kernel analysed in our case study on Blast (cf.
Chapter 3) have previously been detected using this technique.
A further recent attempt to ﬁnd bugs in operating system code is based on
abstract interpretation [Cousot and Cousot, 2002] and presented in [Breuer and
Pickin, 2006]. The authors checked about 700k lines of code taken from recent
versions of the Linux kernel for correct locking behaviour. The paper focuses on the
kernel's spinlock interface and problems related to sleep under a spinlock. Several
new bugs in the Linux kernel were found during the experiments. However, the
authors suggest that their approach could be improved by adopting model checking
techniques in order to guide the analysis in situations where the current method has
to consider all, even unreachable paths within the control ﬂow.
An extensive survey on automated techniques for the formal veriﬁcation of soft-
ware, focusing on abstract static analysis, software model checking and bounded
software model checking has recently been published in [D'Silva et al., 2008]. On
the following pages we focus on approaches and techniques for the analysis and
veriﬁcation of pointer programs.
2.3.1 Analysing Pointer Programs
The automated, static analysis of pointer programs has been an important but still
unsolved issue in computer science for more than thirty years. In [Wilhelm et al.,
2000], Wilhelm et al. give a summary of questions that should be answered by
automatic reasoning about memory structures used by pointer programs:
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Null-Pointers. Does a pointer contain the value NULL at a certain point in
program execution?
Aliasing and Sharing. May two pointer variables point to the same heap
cell? Do they always point to the same heap cell? Is more than one pointer
component pointing to a certain heap cell?
Reachability. Is a heap cell reachable from any pointer variable or pointer
component?
Disjointness. Do allocated data structures have common elements?
Cyclicity. Are heap cells parts of cyclic data structures?
Shape. What do data structures on the heap look like? Can we derive safety
properties from regularities in their structure?
The above list is not exhaustive. For example from [Balakrishnan et al., 2008] we
can obtain questions that are more related to the security of software systems:
Conﬁdentiality. Does the program leak any sensitive information like keying
material or passwords?
Early work on analysing pointer programs goes back to Burstall, who published
on techniques for proving correctness of programs which alter data structures in
1972 [Burstall, 1972]. In this paper, Burstall introduces a novel kind of assertion
called distinct nonrepeating tree system. This approach utilises a sequence of such
assertions where each element of the sequence describes a distinct region of storage
[Burstall, 1972]1. The basic idea of Burstall's work provides a store-based opera-
tional semantics [Kirchner, 2005] for heap usage by modelling the heap used by a
program under consideration as a collection of variables providing a mapping from
memory addresses to values. Analysis and Veriﬁcation are then done by reasoning
about this model using Hoare logic [Hoare, 1969]. The approach has been applied
in recent research on verifying pointer programs using separation logic with spatial
conjunction [Kuncak and Rinard, 2004; Reynolds, 2000, 2002] and on proof automa-
tion by providing integration in existing theorem proving infrastructures [Mehta and
Nipkow, 2005]. Techniques based on store-based semantics have several advantages.
Firstly, they are very natural because they correspond closely to the architecture of
current computer hardware, operating systems, as well as imperative programming
languages that allow the direct manipulation of pointers. Furthermore, store-based
techniques can be assumed to scale well to large programs because it is possible to
1As cited by Reynolds in [Reynolds, 2000].
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compute the eﬀect of procedures on the global heap from their eﬀect on sub-heaps
[Rinetzky et al., 2005].
However, with the emergence of programming languages such as Java, store-less
semantics for heap access have been developed [Bozga et al., 2003]. By abstracting
away from speciﬁc memory addresses, these heap representations provide a concep-
tual and compact view on the memory usage of a program.
2.3.2 Aliasing
Identifying sharing relationships between memory cells and variables in computer
programs is the central problem to be solved in order to answer most of the above
questions. Thus, alias analysis is a wide research area. Several generic shape graph-
based approaches for performing shape analysis for imperative programs have been
published [Sagiv et al., 1998; Wilhelm et al., 2000]. However, most practical work on
this topic has been conducted by the compiler construction and optimisation com-
munity. In order to give a simple systematics for these approaches, we distinguish
between algorithms based on source code analysis and those working on executable
object code.
Analysing source code. In [Deutsch, 1992, 1994], Deutsch provides a very exact
alias analysis for high-level programs based on a store-less semantics and abstract
interpretation (cf. Section 2.3.3). The algorithm can deal with dynamic allocation
and de-allocation of heap objects as well as recursive program structures. However,
the analysis makes heavy use of explicit data type declarations deﬁning the shape
of allocated structures. Therefore, the algorithm is not usable for untyped pro-
gramming languages or languages that allow pointer arithmetic and unchecked type
conversion such as type casts in C. Deutsch's work has been extended in several re-
cent publications. In [Venet, 1999], Venet proposes an algorithm based on Deutsch's
research that does not rely on correct type information but works for untyped pro-
grams. The core idea behind this algorithm is to represent access paths within data
structures as ﬁnite-state automata. Alias pairs are then described using numerical
constraints on the number of times each transition of an automaton may be used.
However, pointer arithmetic remains an unsolved issue in all approaches on alias
analysis for high-level programs. The problem is partially covered by algorithms
such as the one proposed by Wilson and Lam in [Wilson and Lam, 1995], but makes
conservative assumptions about aliasing for several cases in which the analysis will
fail.
Recently, compositional approaches [Calcagno et al., 2009; Yang et al., 2007] to
shape analysis [Wilhelm et al., 2000] for proving pointer safety have been proposed.
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However, all available work in this area is based on analysing the source code of
a program under consideration. Hence, calls to library functions or switches to
another programming language as well as programming constructs such as function
pointers are treated as non-deterministic assignments.
A major restriction for pointer analysis techniques based on abstractions of high-
level programming languages lies in the control ﬂow of many programs. Since analy-
sis techniques need to follow the program execution in order to trace memory access,
program constructs like function pointers, computed jumps and calls of external li-
brary functions constrain the practicability of these algorithms.
Analysing object code. The limitations of source code-based algorithms lead
to the development of alias analysis techniques that operate on object code. This
group of algorithms is of interest for the optimisation of systems that manipulate
executable code directly  runtime linkers are an interesting examples for this. In
[Debray et al., 1998], Debray et al. introduce a simple and eﬃcient ﬂow-sensitive
alias analysis for executable code which has been used link-time optimisation. De-
spite the fact that this algorithm explicitly sacriﬁces precision for eﬃciency in several
cases, it can handle complex program ﬂows and pointer arithmetic. In a modiﬁed
version, Debray's algorithm has also been considered for the use on the intermediate
language of the gcc compiler family [Gupta and Sharma, 2003]. Another recent
approach for a memory analysis algorithm based on the inspection of object code is
given by Balakrishnan and Reps in [Balakrishnan and Reps, 2004]. Their algorithm
value-set analysis uses an abstract domain for representing over-approximation of
the set of values that each data object can hold at each program point. Therefore,
the algorithm tracks addresses and integer values simultaneously.
2.3.3 Abstraction and
Partial Order Techniques
One of the major limitations of exhaustive veriﬁcation techniques such as model
checking lies in the complexity of modern software systems. While early approaches
in model checking aimed on the veriﬁcation of the alternating bit protocol with 20
states [Clarke et al., 1983], current software systems, especially in the domain of
operating system veriﬁcation, are inﬁnite-state systems. Constructing their state
space leads to the state explosion problem as explained by Godefroid in [Godefroid,
1994]. Therefore, model checking such systems requires the use of eﬃcient data
structures for storing and manipulating large sets of states, as well as automatic
techniques that reduce a systems state space by abstracting away from unneeded
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details [Clarke et al., 1992].
Predicate abstraction. Most abstraction techniques currently used in software
model checking are based on the work of Graf and Saïdi in [Graf and Hassen Saïdi,
1997]. The author's approach employs abstract interpretation [Cousot, 1996] to
compute program invariants in order to map the concrete states of a system to
abstract states according to their evaluation under a ﬁnite set of predicates. This
results in reducing an inﬁnite-state model under consideration to a ﬁnite-state one,
in which, for example, boolean variables correspond to assertions over the concrete
model.
Recently, algorithms performing predicate abstraction directly on the source code
of a program under consideration have been developed [Ball et al., 2001; Henzinger
et al., 2002b] and implemented in tools such as SLAM [Ball and Rajamani, 2001]
and Blast [Henzinger et al., 2002a]. Despite the fact that these algorithms and
tools provide a valuable contribution to the ﬁeld of static source code analysis, their
capabilities are limited by not covering the problem of memory safety in full. This is
mainly because of unspeciﬁed constructs in high-level programming languages and
the use of function pointers and computed jumps, which are decided at compile-time
or runtime. Furthermore, the aliasing problem has a deep impact on such analysis
techniques. As we show in a case study on the BLAST toolkit provided in Chap-
ter 3, this exemplarily but state-of-the-art tool does not provide suﬃcient facilities
for tracking values that are passed in a call-by-reference manner to functions with-
out manually instrumenting the program or providing additional alias information.
The techniques also turned out to be inapplicable for keeping track of unbounded
numbers of allocations and concurrent program ﬂow.
Partial order techniques. Veriﬁcation techniques based on state space explo-
ration are limited by the excessive size of the state space. Especially for modelling
concurrency the state explosion problem has a high impact because one has to
consider interleaving program executions. However, one can assume that many in-
terleavings of concurrent events corresponding to the same execution contain related
information. Therefore, model checking or simulating all interleavings possible in a
program under consideration may not be required. This has been discussed by the
model checking community under the term partial-order methods as a technique
that reduces the impact of the state-explosion problem [Godefroid, 1994]. The intu-
ition behind these techniques is that instead of exploring all interleaving executions
only a part of the state space is explored. This part is chosen in a way that makes
it provably suﬃcient to check a given property. Partial order techniques have been
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implemented in model checking frameworks such as Spin [Holzmann, 2003] for com-
munication protocols as well as VeriSoft for verifying software systems [Chandra
et al., 2002; Godefroid, 1997]. The VeriSoft approach is particularly interesting.
As summarised in [Chandra et al., 2002] its focus lies on verifying communication
related properties in concurrent software systems. VeriSoft involves model checking
by stateless guided program execution where program runs are chosen nondetermin-
istically.
Furthermore, partial order techniques have also been used in program testing
[Gälli et al., 2006, 2004; Memon et al., 2001]. These approaches aim on the reduction
of the total amount of test cases by identifying and removing cases, which are already
covered by others.
Program slicing. Another important abstraction technique and SOCA ingredient
is path-sensitive slicing. Program slicing was introduced by Weiser [Weiser, 1981] as
a technique for automatically selecting only those parts of a program that may aﬀect
the values of interest computed at some point of interest. Diﬀerent to conventional
slicing, our slices are computed over a single path instead of an entire program,
similar to what has been introduced as dynamic slicing in [Korel and Laski, 1990]
and path slicing in [Jhala and Majumdar, 2005]. In contrast to those approaches,
we use conventional slicing criteria and leave a program's input initially unspeciﬁed.
In addition, while collecting program dependencies is relatively easy at source code
level, it becomes diﬃcult at object code level when dependencies to the heap and
stack are involved. The technique employed by SOCA for dealing with the program's
heap and stack is an adaptation of the recency abstraction described in [Balakrishnan
and Reps, 2006].
2.3.4 Software Model Checking
By having the potential of being exhaustive and fully automatic, model checking,
in combination with abstraction and reﬁnement, is a successful technique used in
software veriﬁcation [Clarke et al., 2000]. Intensive research in this area has resulted
in software model checkers like Bandera [Corbett et al., 2000] for Java programs or
SLAM/SDV [Ball and Rajamani, 2001], Blast [Henzinger et al., 2002a], SatAbs
[Clarke et al., 2005] and CBMC [Clarke et al., 2004] for analysing C source code.
The major advantage of these tools over model-based model checkers such as Spin
[Holzmann, 2003] is their ability to automatically abstract a model from the source
code of a given program. User interaction should then only be necessary in order
to provide the model checker with a speciﬁcation against which the program can be
checked. Since complete formal speciﬁcations are not available for most programs,
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veriﬁcation will usually be relative to a partial speciﬁcation that covers the usage
rules of the Application Programming Interface used by the program. However,
up to now all releases of SLAM are restricted to verifying properties for Microsoft
Windows device drivers and do not cover memory safety problems [Microsoft Cor-
poration, 2004], while Blast is able to verify a program against a user deﬁned
temporal safety speciﬁcation [Henzinger et al., 2002a] and thus allows checking of
arbitrary C source code. Such a temporal safety speciﬁcation in Blast is a mon-
itor automaton with error locations. It can reﬂect detailed behavioural properties
of the program under consideration. As we will explain in Chapter 3, the Blast
toolkit has several shortcomings related to the detection of memory safety problems
and concurrency issues. Recent work [Sery, 2009] shows further that, again in con-
trast to our SOCA Veriﬁer, BLAST cannot analyse programs with multiplicities of
locks since its speciﬁcation language does not permit the speciﬁcation of observer
automatons for API safety rules with respect to function parameters.
In [Beyer et al., 2005], the use of CCured [Necula et al., 2005] in combination
with software model checking as implemented in Blast for verifying memory safety
of C source code is explained. This is done by inserting additional runtime checks
at all places in the code where pointers are de-referenced. Blast is then employed
to check whether the introduced code is reachable or can be removed again. The
approach focuses on ensuring that only valid pointers are de-referenced along the
execution of a program, which is taken to mean that pointers must not equal NULL
at any point at which they are de-referenced. However, invalid pointers in C do not
necessarily equal NULL in practice.
Model checking bytecode and assembly languages. In recent years, several
approaches to model checking compiled programs by analysing bytecode and assem-
bly code have been presented. In [Visser et al., 2003], Java PathFinder (JPF ) for
model checking Java bytecode is introduced. JPF generates the state space of a
program by monitoring a virtual machine. Model checking is then conducted on
the states explored by the virtual machine, employing collapsing techniques and
symmetry reduction for eﬃciently storing states and reducing the size of the state
space. These techniques are eﬀective because of the high complexity of JPF states
and the speciﬁc characteristics of the Java memory model. In contrast, the SOCA
technique to verifying object code involves relatively simple states and, in diﬀerence
to Java, the order of data within memory is important in IA32 object code. Similar
to JPF, StEAM [Leven et al., 2004] model checks bytecode compiled for the Internet
C Virtual Machine, while BTOR [Brummayer et al., 2008] and [mc]square [Noll and
Schlich, 2008; Schlich and Kowalewski, 2006] are tools for model checking assembly
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code for micro-controllers.
All the above tools are explicit model checkers that require the program's entire
control ﬂow to be known in advance of the analysis. As we have explained above,
this is not feasible in the presence of computed jumps. The SOCA technique has
been especially designed to deal with OS components that make extensive use of
jump computations.
Furthermore, BTOR and [mc]square accept assembly code as their input, which
may either be obtained during compilation of a program or, as suggested in [Schlich
and Kowalewski, 2006], by disassembling a binary program. As shown in [Horspool
and Marovac, 1980], the problem of disassembling a binary program is undecidable
in general. The SOCA technique focuses on the veriﬁcation of binary programs
without the requirement of disassembling a program at once.
Symbolic Execution and Bounded Model Checking Symbolic execution has
been introduced in [King, 1976] as a means of improving program testing by covering
a large class of normal executions with one execution in which symbols representing
arbitrary values are used as input to the program. A recent approach based on man-
ually instrumenting the source code of a program and then using symbolic execution
to derive inputs that make the program crash, has been proposed in [Cadar et al.,
2006]. In contrast to our work, [Cadar et al., 2006] relies on manual annotations, is
not focused on memory safety, and works at source code level.
Several frameworks for integrating symbolic execution with model checking have
recently been presented, including Symbolic JPF [Pasareanu et al., 2008] and DART
[Godefroid et al., 2005]. Symbolic JPF is a successor of the previously mentioned
JPF. DART implements directed and automated random testing to generate test
drivers and harness code to simulate a program's environment. The tool accepts C
programs and automatically extracts function interfaces from source code. Such an
interface is used to seed the analysis with a well-formed random input, which is then
mutated by collecting and negating path constraints while symbolically executing
the program. Unlike the SOCA Veriﬁer, DART handles constraints on integer types
only and does not support pointers and data structures.
A bounded model checker for C source code based on symbolic execution and
SAT solving is SATURN [Xie and Aiken, 2007]. This tool is specialised on checking
locking properties and null-pointer de-references. The authors show that their tool
scales for analysing the entire Linux kernel. Unlike the SOCA Veriﬁer, the approach
in [Xie and Aiken, 2007] computes function summaries instead of adding the respec-
tive code to the control ﬂow, unwinds loops a ﬁxed number of times and does not
handle recursion. Hence, it can be expected to produce more unsound results but
Background and Related Work 27
scale better than our SOCA technique.
A language agnostic tool in the spirit of DART is SAGE [Godefroid et al.,
2008], which is used internally at Microsoft. SAGE works at IA32 instruction level,
tracks integer constraints as bit-vectors, and employs machine-code instrumentation
in a similar fashion as we do in [Mühlberg and Lüttgen, 2009]. SAGE is seeded
with a well-formed program input and explores the program space with respect to
that input. Branches in the control ﬂow are explored by negating path constraints
collected during the initial execution. This diﬀers from our approach since SOCA
does not require seeding but explores the program space automatically from a given
starting point. The SOCA technique eﬀectively computes program inputs for all
paths explored during symbolic execution.
Concolic testing. An area of research closely related to ours is that of concolic
testing [Kim and Kim, 2009; Sen et al., 2005]. This technique relies on perform-
ing concrete execution on random inputs while collecting path constraints along
executed paths. The constraints are then used to compute new inputs driving the
program along alternative paths. In diﬀerence to this approach, SOCA uses sym-
bolic execution to explore all paths and concretises only in order to resolve computed
jumps. Concrete execution in SOCA may also be employed to set up the environ-
ment for symbolic execution [Mühlberg and Lüttgen, 2009].
Alternative approaches to object code veriﬁcation. Alternative approaches
to proving memory safety, other than the kinds of software model checking dis-
cussed in previous sections, are shape analysis [Wilhelm et al., 2000] and separa-
tion logic [Reynolds, 2002]. All recent work in this area [Calcagno et al., 2009;
Josh Berdine and O'Hearn, 2005] is based on analysing the source code of a pro-
gram, and calls to library functions and programming constructs such as function
pointers are simply abstracted using non-deterministic assignments.
Techniques applying theorem proving to verify object code and assembly code
are presented in [Boyer and Yu, 1996] and [Yu and Shao, 2004]. In [Boyer and Yu,
1996] the Nqthm prover is employed for reasoning about the functional correctness
of implementations of well-known algorithms. [Yu and Shao, 2004] proposes a logic-
based type system for concurrent assembly code and uses the Coq proof assistant to
verify programs. In contrast to our work, both techniques do not support higher-
order code pointers including return pointers in procedure calls.
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2.3.5 Object Code Veriﬁcation vs.
Source Code Veriﬁcation
While research in programming languages, computer security and software engi-
neering has led to several tools for analysing source code for programming errors,
program testing has still one major advantage: It is based on the execution of ma-
chine code and not source code.
Shortcomings of Source Code Veriﬁcation. As Balakrishnan et al. explain
in [Balakrishnan et al., 2008], the analysis of source code has several drawbacks. It
is pointed out that severe defects in software may be introduced during compilation
and optimisation. As an example for this, compiler optimisations may remove write
operations to a memory area that occur directly before the area is freed. While
this behaviour appears to be reasonable at ﬁrst glance  the values are never read
afterwards and therefore cannot have any impact on the further program execution
 it gives rise to conﬁdentiality issues if the memory contained sensitive information.
Furthermore, platform-speciﬁc details, such as memory-layout details, the positions
and oﬀsets of variables, as well as the padding between structure ﬁelds or the register
usage of a program, are only visible after compilation [Balakrishnan et al., 2008].
More advantages of the use of object code lie in the fact that software components
may make use of modules such as libraries that are not available in source code
and hence, can only be analysed in object code representation. Also, quite a lot of
software is written in more than one programming language, e.g., device drivers often
contain inlined assembly, and language switches are rarely supported by veriﬁcation
tools operating on source code. However, for executing a program, all its fragments
are transformed into object code, either via compilation or interpretation. Hence,
the object code should be considered as a common representation for programs
that are written in multiple languages. [Balakrishnan et al., 2008]. Another serious
shortcoming of source code veriﬁcation is that high-level programming languages are
often described informally and do not have a formally deﬁned semantics. Therefore,
assumptions about undeﬁned programming constructs must be made. However,
those assumptions concerning the intended semantics of a high-level language are
not necessarily correct [Wahab, 1998].
Related to the veriﬁcation of memory safety properties is the un-decidability of
the aliasing problem. It is impossible to determine syntactically whether a pointer
identiﬁes a given variable and to distinguish syntactically between executable and
un-executable commands [Wahab, 1998]. The aliasing problem renders many ap-
proaches to verify memory safety futile since all source code-based analysis tech-
niques operate on program variables. Today, even industry strength veriﬁcation
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tools such as SDV which is specialised on device drivers, provide sound results only
based on the assumption that the device driver does not have wild pointers [Ball
et al., 2006]. This means that the tool does not check memory safety but assumes
it.
Advantages of Object Code-Based Veriﬁcation. For verifying properties re-
lated to memory safety, the object code representation has several advantages. While
the analysis of source code is limited by the aliasing problem, object code uses ex-
plicit addresses. Since there is no syntactical way of distinguishing between integer
values and addresses and the use of indirect addressing in object code, it is considered
to be hard to analyse. However, due to explicit addresses and compiler optimisations
such as advanced register allocation algorithms, reasoning about memory safety be-
comes easier. As an example, tracking the contents of registers is a less complex
task than tracking arbitrary heap cells or variables [Balakrishnan and Reps, 2005;
Xu et al., 2000]. Furthermore, the use of function pointers and computed jumps
(setjmp() and longjmp() in C), which breaks many source code based tools such
as Blast and SDV during the analysis of a program's control ﬂow, does not need
to be handled in a diﬀerent way than any other piece of object code.
Object code programs are in the native language of a speciﬁc CPU. Since they
are executed directly, no further errors may be introduced by a compiler or a runtime
environment. However, a processor language consists of a large number of highly
specialised instructions [Wahab, 1998], carrying out rather simple actions. This
results in the fact that object code programs consist of many more statements than
the original high-level program. Hence, in the step of abstracting a model from a
program under consideration, i.e. for software model checking, all instructions need
to be taken into account. This is because the program in in high-level source code.
In order to analyse an object code program, it needs to be disassembled ﬁrst. As
explained in [van Emmerik, 2003], this step requires the separation of data from code,
which is not given in machine code programs. [Horspool and Marovac, 1980] show
this problem to be undecidable in general, thus requiring approximation. However,
recent work such as [Balakrishnan and Reps, 2005; Xu et al., 2000] demonstrates
that acceptable results can be achieved as long as self-modifying programs are not
considered.
Despite this we consider analysing the object code representation of programs
as a valuable technique for verifying memory safety properties of software systems.
Chapter 3
Evaluation of Existing Software
Model Checkers
In this chapter we investigate to which extent software model checking as imple-
mented in Blast (Berkeley Lazy Abstraction Software veriﬁcation Tool, [Henzinger
et al., 2002a]) can aid a practitioner during operating system software development.
To do so, we analyse whether these tools are able to detect errors that have been
reported for recent releases of the Linux kernel. We consider programming errors
related to memory safety (cf. Section 3.1) and locking behaviour (cf. Section 3.2). As
pointed out in [Chou et al., 2001] memory safety and incorrect handling of locks are
the main reasons for defects found in operating system components. Here, memory
safety is interpreted as the property that an operating system component never
de-references an invalid pointer, since this would cause the program to end up in
an undeﬁned state. Correct locking behaviour means that functions that ensure
mutual exclusion on the physical resources of a system are called in a way that is
free of deadlocks and starvation. Both classes of problems are traceable by check-
ing whether an operating system component complies with basic usage rules of the
program interface provided by the kernel.
The code examples utilised in this chapter are taken from releases 2.6.13 and
2.6.14 of the Linux kernel. They have been carefully chosen by searching the kernel's
change log for ﬁxed memory problems and ﬁxed deadlock conditions, in a way that
the underlying problems are representative for memory safety and locking behaviour
as well as easily explainable without referring to long source code listings.1 Our
studies use version 2.0 of Blast, which was released in October 2005.
The focus of our work is on showing at what scale a give problem statement
and a program's source code need to be adapted in order to detect an error. We
1All source code used is either included or referenced by a commit key as provided by the source
code management system git which is used in the Linux kernel community; see www.kernel.org
for further information on git and Linux.
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discuss how much work is required to ﬁnd a certain usage rule violation in a given
snippet of a Linux driver, and how diﬃcult this work is to perform in Blast.
Due to space constraints, we cannot present all of our case studies in full here;
however, all ﬁles necessary to reproduce our results can be downloaded from http:
//www.beetzsee.de/blast/. The majority of this chapter has been previously
published in [Mühlberg and Lüttgen, 2007a]. There is also a technical report version
[Mühlberg and Lüttgen, 2007b] with additional details available.
The Blast toolkit The popular Blast toolkit implements an advanced ab-
straction algorithm, called lazy abstraction [Henzinger et al., 2002b], for building
a model of some C source code, and model-checking algorithm for checking whether
some speciﬁed label placed in the source code is reachable. This label can either
be automatically introduced by instrumenting the source with an explicit temporal
safety speciﬁcation, be added via assert() statements, or be manually introduced
into the source. In any case, the input source ﬁle needs to be preprocessed using a
standard C preprocessor like gcc. In this step, all header and source ﬁles included
by the input ﬁle under consideration are merged into one ﬁle. It is this preprocessed
source code that is passed to Blast to construct and verify a model using predicate
abstraction.
Related Case Studies with Blast Blast has been applied for the veriﬁcation
of memory safety as well as locking properties before [Beyer et al., 2005; Henzinger
et al., 2004, 2002a, 2003]. In [Beyer et al., 2005], the use of CCured [Necula et al.,
2005] in combination with Blast for verifying memory safety of C source code is
explained. This is done by inserting additional runtime checks at all places in the
code where pointers are de-referenced. Blast is then employed to check whether
the introduced code is reachable or can be removed again. The approach focuses on
ensuring that only valid pointers are de-referenced along the execution of a program,
which is taken to mean that pointers must not equal NULL at any point at which
they are de-referenced. However, invalid pointers in C do not necessarily equal NULL
in practice. In contrast to [Beyer et al., 2005], we will interpret pointer invalidity
in a more general way and conduct our studies on real-world examples rather than
constructed examples.
A methodology for verifying and certifying systems code on a simple locking
problem is explained in [Henzinger et al., 2002a], which deals with the spinlock in-
terface provided by the Linux kernel. Spinlocks ensure that a kernel process can
spin on a CPU without being preempted by another process. The framework stud-
ied in [Henzinger et al., 2002a] is used to prove that calls of spin_lock() and
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spin_unlock() in Linux device drivers always alternate. In contrast to this work,
our case studies will be more detailed and thereby will be providing further insights
into the usability of Blast.
Two project reports of graduate students give further details on Blast's prac-
tical use. In [Mong, 2004], Mong applies Blast to a doubly linked list implemen-
tation with dynamic allocation of its elements and veriﬁes correct allocation and
de-allocation. The paper explains that Blast was not powerful enough to keep
track of the state of the list, i.e., the number of its elements. Jie and Shivkumar
report in [Jie and Shivaji, 2004] on their experience in applying Blast to a user
level implementation of a virtual ﬁle system. They focus on verifying correct locking
behaviour for data structures of the implementation and were able to successfully
verify several test cases and to ﬁnd one new error. However, in the majority of test
cases Blast failed due to documented limitations, e.g., by not being able to deal
with function pointers, or terminated with obscure error messages. Both studies
were conducted in 2004 and thus based on version 1.0 of Blast. As shown in this
chapter, Blast's current version has similar limitations.
A further case study on applying BLAST to a protocol stack is presented in [Kolb
et al., 2009], focusing on verifying the correct implementation of three API usage
rules in that stack. The authors agree with the limitations of the Blast toolkit we
are pointing out in [Mühlberg and Lüttgen, 2007a] and in this Chapter.
3.1 Checking Memory Safety with Blast
This section focuses on using Blast for checking usage rules related to memory
safety, for which we have analysed several errors in diﬀerent device drivers. The
examples studied by us include use-after-free errors in the kernel's SCSI2 and Inﬁni-
Band3 subsystems. The former is the small computer system interface standard for
attaching peripheral devices to computers, while the latter is an industry standard
designed to connect processor nodes and I/O nodes to form a system area network.
In each of these examples, an invalid pointer that is not NULL is de-referenced, which
causes the system to behave in an undeﬁned way. This type of bug is not covered by
the work on memory safety of Beyer et al. in [Beyer et al., 2005] and cannot easily
be detected by runtime checks.
The example we will study here in detail is a use-after-free error spotted by the
Coverity source code analyser (www.coverity.com) in the I2O subsystem of the
Linux kernel (cf. Section 3.1.1). To check for this bug in Blast we ﬁrst specify
2Commit 2d6eac6c4fdaa69656d66c80754d267be233cc3f.
3Commit d0743a5b7b837334cb414b773529d51de3de0471.
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drivers/message/i2o/pci.c:
300 static int __devinit
i2o_pci_probe(
struct pci_dev *pdev,
301 const struct pci_device_id
*id)
302 {
303 struct i2o_controller *c;
330 c = i2o_iop_alloc();
423 free_controller:
424 i2o_iop_free(c);
425 put_device(
c->device.parent);
432 }
Figure 3.1: Extract of drivers/message/i2o/pci.c.
a temporal safety speciﬁcation in the Blast speciﬁcation language. Taking this
speciﬁcation, Blast is supposed to automatically generate an instrumented version
of the C source code for analysis (cf. Section 3.1.2). However, due to an appar-
ent bug in Blast, this step fails for our example, and we are therefore forced to
manually instrument our code by inserting ERROR labels at appropriate positions
(cf. Section 3.1.3). However, it will turn out that Blast does not track important
operations on pointers, which is not mentioned in Blast's user manual and without
which our example cannot be checked (cf. Section 3.1.4).
3.1.1 The I2O Use-After-Free Error
The I2O subsystem bug of interest to us resided in lines 423425 of the source
code ﬁle drivers/message/i2o/pci.c. The listing in Fig. 3.1 is an abbreviated
version of the ﬁle pci.c before the bug was ﬁxed. One can see that function
i2o_iop_alloc() is called at line 330 of the code extract. This function is deﬁned in
drivers/message/i2o/iop.c and basically allocates memory for an i2o_controller
structure using kmalloc(). At the end of the listing, this memory is freed by
i2o_iop_free(c). The bug in this piece of code arises from the call of put_device()
in line 425, since its parameter c->device.parent causes an already freed pointer to
be de-referenced. The bug has been ﬁxed in commit d2b0e84d195a341c1cc5b45ec2
098ee23bc1fe9d, by simply swapping lines 424 and 425 in the source ﬁle.
This bug oﬀers various diﬀerent ways to utilise Blast. A generic temporal safety
property for identifying bugs like this would state that any pointer that has been an
argument to kfree() is never used again unless it has been re-allocated. A probably
easier way would be to check whether the pointer c in i2o_pci_probe() is never
used again after i2o_iop_free() has been called with c as its argument. Checking
the ﬁrst, more generic property would require us to put function deﬁnitions from
other source ﬁles into pci.c, since Blast considers only functions that are available
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in its input ﬁle. Therefore, we focus on verifying the latter property.
Checking for violations even of the latter, more restricted property will lead to
a serious problem. A close look at the struct i2o_controller and its initialisation
in the function i2o_iop_alloc() reveals that i2o_controller contains a function
pointer which can be used as a destructor. As is explained in Blast's user manual,
the current release does not support function pointers; they are ignored completely.
Further, the manual states that correctness of the analysis is then modulo the
assumption that function pointer calls are irrelevant to the property being checked.
This assumption is however not always satisﬁed in practice, as we will see later in
our example.
3.1.2 Veriﬁcation With a
Temporal Safety Speciﬁcation
Ignoring the function pointer limitation, we developed the temporal safety speci-
ﬁcation presented in Fig. 3.2. The speciﬁcation language used by Blast is easy
to understand and allows the assignment of status variables and events. In our
speciﬁcation we use a global status variable allocstatus_c to cover the possible
states of the struct c of our example, which can be set to 0 meaning not allo-
cated and 1 meaning allocated. Furthermore, we deﬁne three events, one for each
of the functions i2o_iop_alloc(), i2o_iop_free() and put_device(). All func-
tions have special preconditions and calling them may modify the status of c. The
special token $? matches anything. Intuitively, the speciﬁcation given in Fig. 3.2
states that i2o_iop_alloc() and i2o_iop_free() must be called alternately, and
put_device() must only be called when c has not yet been freed. Note that this
temporal safety speciﬁcation does not cover the usage rule for i2o_iop_free()
and put_device() in general. We are using one status variable to guard calls of
i2o_iop_free() and put_device() regardless of its arguments. Hence, the speci-
ﬁcation will work only as long as there is only one pointer to an i2o_controller
structure involved.
Using the speciﬁcation of Fig. 3.2, Blast should instrument a given C input ﬁle
by adding a global status variable and error labels for all violations of the precondi-
tions. The instrumentation is done by the program spec.opt which is part of the
Blast distribution. For our example taken from the Linux kernel, we ﬁrst obtained
the command used by the kernel's build system to compile pci.c with gcc. We ap-
pended the option -E to force the compilation to stop after preprocessing, resulting
in a C source ﬁle containing all required parts of the kernel headers. This step is nec-
essary since Blast cannot know of all the additional deﬁnitions and include paths
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global int allocstatus_c = 0;
event
{
pattern { $? = i2o_iop_alloc(); }
guard { allocstatus_c == 0 }
action { allocstatus_c = 1; }
}
event
{
pattern { i2o_iop_free($?); }
guard { allocstatus_c == 1 }
action { allocstatus_c = 0; }
}
event
{
pattern { put_device($?); }
guard { allocstatus_c == 1 }
}
Figure 3.2: A temporal safety speciﬁcation for pci.c.
used to compile the ﬁle. Unfortunately, it expands pci.c from 484 lines of code
to approximately 16k lines, making it diﬃcult to ﬁnd syntactical problems which
Blast cannot deal with. Despite spending a lot of eﬀort in trying to use spec.opt,
we never managed to get this work. The program mostly failed with unspeciﬁc
errors such as Fatal error: exception Failure(Function declaration not
found). Finding such an error in a huge source without having a line number or
other hint is almost impossible, especially since gcc compiles the ﬁle without any
warning. We constructed several simpliﬁcations of the preprocessed ﬁle in order to
trace the limitations of spec.opt, but did not get a clear indication of what the
source is. We suspect it might be a problem with parsing complex data structures
and inline assembly imported from the Linux headers.
Given the bug inBlast and in order to demonstrate that our speciﬁcation indeed
covers the programming error in pci.c, we developed a rather abstract version
of pci.c which is shown in Fig. 3.3. Using this version and the speciﬁcation of
Fig. 3.2, we were able to obtain an instrumented version of our source code without
encountering the bug in spec.opt. Running Blast on the instrumented version
then produced the following output:
$ spec.opt test2.spc test2.c
[...]
$ pblast.opt instrumented.c
[...]
Error found! The system is unsafe :-(
In summary, the example studied here shows that the speciﬁcation used in this
section is suﬃcient to ﬁnd the bug. However, the approach required by Blast has
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test2.h:
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
typedef struct device
{
int parent;
} device;
typedef struct i2o_controller
{
struct device device;
} i2o_controller;
i2o_controller *i2o_iop_alloc
(void);
void i2o_iop_free
(i2o_controller *c);
void put_device (int i);
test2.c:
#include "test2.h"
i2o_controller *i2o_iop_alloc
(void)
{ i2o_controller *c;
c = malloc(
sizeof(struct i2o_controller));
return (c); }
void i2o_iop_free
(i2o_controller *c)
{ free (c); }
void put_device (int i) { }
int main (void)
{ i2o_controller *c;
c = i2o_iop_alloc ();
i2o_iop_free (c);
put_device (c->device.parent);
return (0); }
Figure 3.3: Manual simpliﬁcation of pci.c.
several disadvantages. Firstly, it is not automatic at all. Although we ended up
with only a few lines of code, it took quite a lot of time to produce this code by
hand and to ﬁgure out what parts of the original pci.c are accepted by Blast.
Secondly, the methodology works only if the bug is known beforehand; hence we did
not learn anything new about unwanted behaviour of this driver's code. We needed
to simplify the code to an extent where the relation to the original source code
may be considered as questionable. The third problem lies in the speciﬁcation used.
Since it treats the allocation and de-allocation as something similar to a locking
problem, we would not be able to use it in a piece of code that refers to more than
one dynamically allocated object. A more generic speciﬁcation must be able to deal
with multiple pointers. According to [Beyer et al., 2004], such a generic speciﬁcation
should be possible to write by applying a few minor modiﬁcations such as deﬁning a
shadow control state and replacing $? with $1. However, in practice the program
generating the instrumented C source ﬁle failed with obscure error messages.
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3.1.3 Veriﬁcation Without a
Temporal Safety Speciﬁcation
Since Blast could not deal with verifying the original pci.c using an explicit
speciﬁcation of the use-after-free property, we will now try and manually instrument
the source ﬁle so that our bug can be detected whenever an ERROR label is reachable.
When conducting our instrumentation, the following modiﬁcations were applied
by hand to pci.c and related ﬁles:
1. A variable unsigned int alloc_status was added to the deﬁnition of struct
i2o_controller in
include/linux/i2o.h.
2. The prototypes of i2o_iop_alloc() and i2o_iop_free() were removed from
drivers/message/i2o/core.h.
3. The prototype of put_device() was deleted from include/ linux/device.h.
4. C source code for the functions put_device(), i2o_iop_free(), i2o_iop_
release() and i2o_iop_alloc() was copied from iop.c and drivers/base
/core.c into pci.c. The functions were modiﬁed such that the new ﬁeld
alloc_status of a freshly allocated struct i2o_controller is set to 1 by
i2o_iop_alloc(). i2o_iop_free() no longer de-allocates the structure but
checks whether alloc_status equals 1 and sets it to 0; otherwise, it jumps to
the ERROR label. put_device() was modiﬁed to operate on the whole struct
i2o_controller and jumps to ERROR if alloc_status equals 0.
By feeding these changes into the model checker it is possible to detect duplicate
calls of i2o_iop_free() on a pointer to a struct i2o_controller, as well as
calls of put_device() on a pointer that has already been freed. Even calls of
i2o_iop_free() and put_device() on a pointer that has not been allocated with
i2o_ iop_alloc(), should result in an error report since nothing can be said about
the status of alloc_status in such a case.
After preprocessing the modiﬁed source ﬁles and running Blast, we get the out-
put Error found! The system is unsafe :-(. Even after we reduced the con-
tent of i2o_pci_probe() to something quite similar to the main() function shown in
Fig. 3.3 and after putting the erroneous calls of put_device() and i2o_iop_free()
in the right order, the system was still unsafe from Blast's point of view. It took
us some time to ﬁgure out that Blast does not appear to consider the content of
pointers at all.
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test5.c:
1 #include <stdlib.h>
2
3 typedef struct example_struct
4 {
5 void *data;
6 size_t size;
7 } example_struct;
8
9
10 void init (example_struct *p)
11 {
12 p->data = NULL;
13 p->size = 0;
14
15 return;
16 }
17
18 int main (void)
19 {
20 example_struct p1;
21
22 init (&p1);
23 if (p1.data != NULL ||
p1.size != 0)
24 { goto ERROR; }
25 else
26 { goto END; };
27
28 ERROR:
29 return (1);
30
31 END:
32 return (0);
33 }
Figure 3.4: An example for pointer passing.
3.1.4 Blast and Pointers
We demonstrate this apparent shortcoming of Blast regarding handling pointers
by means of another simple example, for which Blast fails in tracing values behind
pointers over function calls.
As can be seen in the code listing of Fig 3.4, label ERROR can never be reached
in this program since the values of the components of our struct are explicitly set
by function init(). However, Blast produces the following output:
$ gcc -E -o test5.i test5.c
$ pblast.opt test5.i
[...]
Error found! The system is unsafe :-(
Error trace:
23 :: 23: Pred((p1@main).data!=0) :: 29
-1 :: -1: Skip :: 23
10 :: 10: Block(Return(0);) :: -1
12 :: 12: Block(* (p@init ).data = 0;* (p@init ).size = 0;) :: 10
22 :: 22: FunctionCall(init(&(p1@main))) :: -1
-1 :: -1: Skip :: 22
0 :: 0: Block(Return(0);) :: -1
0 :: 0: FunctionCall (__BLAST_initialize_test5.i()) :: -1
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This counterexample shows that Blast does not correlate the pointer p used in
init() and the struct p1 used in main(), and assumes that the if statement in line
23 evaluates to true. After adding a line p1.data = NULL; p1.size = 0; before
the call of init(), Blast claims the system to be safe, even if we modify init()
to reset the values so that they diﬀer from NULL (and 0).
We were able to reproduce this behaviour in similar examples with pointers to
integer values and arrays. Switching on the BDD-based alias analysis implemented
in Blast also did not solve the problem. The example shows that Blast does not
only ignore function pointer calls as stated in its user manual, but appears to assume
that all pointer operations have no eﬀect. This limitation is not documented in the
Blast manual and renders Blast almost unusable for the veriﬁcation of properties
related to our understanding of memory safety.
3.1.5 Results
Our experiments on memory safety show that Blast is able to ﬁnd the programming
error discovered by the Coverity checker. Out of eight examples, we were able to
detect two problems after minor modiﬁcations to the source code, and three after
applying manual abstraction. Three further programming errors could not be traced
by using Blast. Indeed, Blast has some major restrictions. The main problem is
that Blast ignores variables addressed by a pointer. As stated in its user manual,
Blast assumes that only variables of the same type are aliased. Since this is the
case in our examples, we initially assumed that our examples could be veriﬁed with
Blast, which is not the case. Moreover, we encountered bugs and deﬁciencies in
spec.opt which forced us to apply substantial and time consuming modiﬁcations
to source code. Most of these modiﬁcations and simpliﬁcations would require a
developer to know about the error in advance. Thus, from a practitioner's point
of view, Blast is not of much help in ﬁnding unknown errors related to memory
safety. However, it needs to be mentioned that Blast was designed for verifying
API usage rules of a diﬀerent type than those required for memory safety. More
precisely, Blast is intended for proving the adherence of pre- and post-conditions
denoted by integer values and for ensuring API usage rules concerning the order in
which certain functions are called, regardless of pointer arguments, return values
and the eﬀects of aliasing. A summary of our experience with Blast and memory
safety is given in Table 3.1.
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Table 3.1: Result summary for memory safety properties
Memory Safety Example
Error Type 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
NULL de-reference x
use-after-free x x x x
double free x
overrun error x
pointer arithmetic x
involves concurrency x
Error found by Blast M M f M f m f m
Key: d = directly; m = minor modiﬁcations; M = manual abstraction; f = failed
3.2 Checking Locking Properties
with Blast
Verifying correct locking behaviour is something used in almost all examples pro-
vided by the developers of Blast [Beyer et al., 2004; Henzinger et al., 2002a]. In
[Henzinger et al., 2002a], the authors checked parts of the Linux kernel for correct
locking behaviour while using the spinlock API and stated that Blast showed a
decent level of performance during these tests. Spinlocks provide a very simple
but quite eﬃcient locking mechanism to ensure, e.g., that a kernel thread may not
be preempted while serving interrupts. The kernel thread acquires a certain lock
by calling spin_lock(l), where l is a previously initialised pointer to a struct
spinlock_t identifying the lock. A lock is released by calling spin_unlock() with
the same parameter. The kernel provides a few additional functions that control the
interrupt behaviour while the lock is held. By their nature, spinlocks are intended
for use on multiprocessor systems where each resource may be associated with a
special spinlock, and where several kernel threads need to operate independently on
these resources. However, as far as concurrency is concerned, uniprocessor systems
running a preemptive kernel behave like multiprocessor systems.
Finding examples for the use of spinlocks is not diﬃcult since they are widely
deployed. While experimenting with Blast and the spinlock functions on several
small components of the Linux kernel we experienced that it performs well with
functions using only one lock. We focused on functions taken from the USB subsys-
tem in drivers/usb/core. Due to further unspeciﬁc parse errors with the program
spec.opt we could not use a temporal safety speciﬁcation directly on the kernel
source. However, in this case we were able to generate the instrumented source ﬁle
and to verify properties by separating the functions under consideration from the
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global int lockstatus = 2;
event
{
pattern { spin_lock_init($?); }
guard { lockstatus == 2 }
action { lockstatus = 0; }
}
event
{
pattern { spin_lock($?); }
guard { lockstatus == 0 }
action { lockstatus = 1; }
}
event
{
pattern { spin_unlock($?); }
guard { lockstatus == 1 }
action { lockstatus = 0; }
}
event
{
pattern { $? = sleep($?); }
guard { lockstatus == 0 }
}
Figure 3.5: A temporal safety speciﬁcation for spinlocks.
remaining driver source and by providing simpliﬁed header ﬁles.
In Fig. 3.5 we provide our basic temporal safety speciﬁcation for verifying locking
behaviour. Variable lockstatus encodes the possible states of a spinlock; the initial
value 2 represents the state in which the lock has not been initialised, while 1 and 0
denote that the lock is held or has been released, respectively. The pattern within
the speciﬁcation varies for the diﬀerent spinlock functions used within the driver
source under consideration, and the speciﬁcation can easily be extended to cover
forbidden functions that may sleep. An example for a function sleep() is provided
in the speciﬁcation of Fig. 3.5.
Diﬃculties arise with functions that acquire more than one lock. Since all spin-
lock functions use a pointer to a struct spinlock_t in order to identify a certain
lock, and since the values behind pointers are not suﬃciently tracked in Blast, we
were forced to rewrite parts of the driver's source and the kernel's spinlock inter-
face. Instead of the pointers to spinlock_t structs we utilise global integer variables
representing the state of a certain lock. We have used this methodology to verify
an example of a recently ﬁxed deadlock4 in the Linux kernel's SCSI subsystem. In
Fig. 3.6 we provide an extract of one of the functions modiﬁed in the ﬁx. We see
that the spinlocks in this example are integrated in more complex data structures
referenced via pointers. Even worse, this function calls a function pointer passed
in the argument done in line 1581, which was the source of the deadlock before
the bug was ﬁxed. To verify this special case, removing the function pointer and
4Commit d7283d61302798c0c57118e53d7732bec94f8d42.
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1564 int ata_scsi_queuecmd(struct
scsi_cmnd *cmd, void
(*done)(struct scsi_cmnd *))
1565 {
1566 struct ata_port *ap;
1567 struct ata_device *dev;
1568 struct scsi_device
*scsidev = cmd->device;
1569 struct Scsi_Host
*shost = scsidev->host;
1571 ap = (struct ata_port *)
&shost->hostdata[0];
1573 spin_unlock(shost->host_lock);
1574 spin_lock(&ap->host_set->lock);
1581 done(cmd);
1597 spin_unlock(&ap->host_set->lock);
1598 spin_lock(shost->host_lock);
1600 }
Figure 3.6: Extract of drivers/scsi/libata-scsi.c.
providing a dummy function done() with a precondition assuring that the lock on
shost->host_lock is not held is needed. However, we were able to verify both the
deadlock condition before the ﬁx had been applied, as well as deadlock freedom for
the ﬁxed version of the source.
During our experiments we analysed several other examples of deadlock condi-
tions. The more interesting examples are the spinlock problem explained above, and
another one in the SCSI subsystem,5 as well as a bug in a IEEE1394 driver6. We
were able to detect the locking problems in all of these examples and proved the
ﬁxed source ﬁles to be free of these bugs.
Results. Out of eight examples for locking problems we were able to detect only
ﬁve. However, when comparing our results with the conclusions of the previous sec-
tion, Blast worked much better for the locking properties because it required fewer
modiﬁcations to the source code. From a practitioner's point of view, Blast per-
formed acceptable as long as only one lock was involved. After considerable eﬀorts
in simplifying the spinlock API  mainly removing the use of pointers and manu-
ally adding error labels to the spinlock functions  we also managed to deal with
multiple locks. However, we consider it as fairly diﬃcult to preserve the behaviour
of functions that may sleep and therefore must not be called under a spinlock. Even
for large portions of source code, Blast returned its results within a few seconds or
minutes, on a PC equipped with an AMD Athlon 64 processor running at 2200 MHz
and 1 GB of RAM. Hence, Blast's internal slicing and abstraction techniques work
very well.
We have to point out that the code listing in Fig. 3.6 represents one of the easily
5Commit fe2e17a405a58ec8a7138fee4ebe101858b636e0.
6Commit 910573c7c4aced8fd5f45c334cc67862e3424d92.
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Table 3.2: Result summary for locking properties properties
Locking Properties Example
Error Type 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
deadlock condition x x x x x x
other API violation x x
involves concurrency x x
Error found by Blast M M f f f m m f
Key: d = directly; m = minor modiﬁcations; M = manual abstraction; f = failed
understandable programming errors. Many problems in kernel source code are more
subtle. For example, calling functions that may sleep is something that needs to
be avoided. However, if a driver calls a function not available in source code in the
same ﬁle as the driver under consideration, Blast will only be able to detect the
problem if there is an event explicitly deﬁned for this function. A summary of our
results including all 8 examples for locking issues is given in Table 3.2.
3.3 Summary of Results
This section highlights various shortcomings of the Blast toolkit which we experi-
enced during our studies. We also present ideas on how Blast could be improved
in order to be more useful for operating system software veriﬁcation.
Lack of documentation. Many problems while experimenting with Blast were
caused by the lack of consistent documentation. For example, a signiﬁcant amount
of time could have been saved in our experiments with memory safety, if the Blast
manual would state that almost all pointer operations are ignored. An in-depth
discussion of the features and limitations of the alias analysis implemented in Blast
would also be very helpful to have.
Non-support of pointers. The fact that Blast does not properly support the
use of pointers, in the sense of Section 3.1.4, must be considered as a major re-
striction, and made our experiments with the spinlock API rather diﬃcult. The
restriction forces one to carry out substantial and time consuming modiﬁcations to
source code. Furthermore, it raises the question whether all important predicates
of a given program can be preserved in a manual step of simpliﬁcation. In some
of our experiments we simply replaced the pointers used by the spinlock functions
with integers representing the state of the lock. This is obviously a pragmatic ap-
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proach which does not reﬂect all possible behaviour of pointer programs. However,
it turned out that it is expressive enough to cover the usage rules of the spinlock
API. As such modiﬁcations could be introduced into the source code automatically,
we consider them as an interesting extension for Blast.
The missing support of function pointers has already been mentioned in Sec-
tion 3.1. It is true that function pointers are often used in both application space
and operating system development. In most cases their eﬀect on the program execu-
tion can only be determined at run-time, not statically at compile-time. Therefore,
we assume that simply skipping all calls of function pointers is acceptable for now.
Usability. There are several issues regarding Blast's usability which are probably
easy to ﬁx, but right now they complicate the work with this tool. Basically, if a
piece of C source is accepted by an ANSI C compiler, it should be accepted by
Blast rather than raising uninformative error messages.
A nice improvement would be to provide wrapper scripts that automate prepro-
cessing and veriﬁcation in a way that Blast can be used with the same arguments
as the compiler. It could be even more useful if functions that are of interest but
from other parts of a given source tree, would be copied in automatically. Since we
obviously do not want to analyse the whole kernel source in a single ﬁle, this should
be integrated into Blast's abstraction/model checking/reﬁnement loop.
Chapter 4
Symbolic Object Code Analysis
In this chapter we present Symbolic Object Code Analysis (SOCA), a novel ap-
proach to identifying violations of memory safety properties based on bounded path-
sensitive symbolic execution of compiled and linked programs. More precisely, we
translate a given program path-wise into systems of bit-vector constraint using an
intermediate representation (IR) borrowed from the Valgrind dynamic binary in-
strumentation framework [Nethercote and Seward, 2007]. In Section 4.2 we outline
the features of this IR language, sketch a simple operational semantics and explain
how IR instructions can be translated into constraints for the Yices SMT solver
[Dutertre and de Moura, 2006].
As we describe in Section 4.3, the SOCA technique employs Yices as execution
and veriﬁcation engine, checking the satisﬁability of the generated constraints sys-
tems. The analysis has to be bounded since the total number of paths as well as the
number of instructions per path in a program is potentially inﬁnite. Our approach
allows us to express a range of memory safety properties as simple assertions over
those constraint systems. In contrast to other methods for ﬁnding memory safety
violations, our technique does not employ program abstraction other than leaving
the program's input initially unspeciﬁed in order to allow the SMT solver to search
for inputs that will drive the program into an error state.
In Section 4.5 we present the results of and extensive evaluation of our technique
by applying a prototypical SOCA Veriﬁer to the Verisec benchmarking suite as well
as to almost 10,000 functions taken from Linux device drivers. For the evaluation
of our SOCA technique we chose Linux device drivers compiled for 32-bit Intel
architectures (IA32, [Intel Corporation, 2009]), as our application domain. Despite
being relatively small in size, device drivers represent an interesting challenge as
they implement hardware access and are usually written in a mixture of C code and
inlined assembly code. This combination makes them particularly hard to test and
analyse with currently available veriﬁcation tools.
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Figure 4.1: Overview of the Linux OS kernel
4.1 Background
The Linux operating system kernel consists of a large and complex code base imple-
menting key tasks such as process management, memory management, ﬁle system
access, device control and networking for about 20 diﬀerent computer architectures.
As illustrated in Fig. 4.1, it features a relatively small monolithic core of compo-
nents such as the scheduler and the memory management subsystem. However, the
majority of its functionality, shown in dark gray in Fig. 4.1, is implemented in terms
of kernel modules or device drivers1 that can be built separately from the kernel and
loaded at runtime. These modular components of the Linux kernel are responsible,
for example, for making a particular physical device attached to the computer re-
spond to a well-deﬁned internal programming interface. Hence, user access to this
device can be performed by means of standardised functions provided by the ker-
nel's System Call Interface, which are independent of the particular driver or device.
Kernel modules amount to roughly two-thirds (≈200 MBytes of code) of the entire
Linux kernel distribution.
Deﬁning memory safety. The scope we are aiming on is to develop a framework
that veriﬁes that every pointer in a given program is (1) valid in the sense that it
never references a memory location outside the address space allocated by or for that
program, and (2) valid with respect to a given set of API usage rules obtained from
the Linux kernel's documentation at every point in program execution the pointer
is dereferenced at. In detail the memory safety properties we are interested in may
be classiﬁed as follows:
(a) Dereferencing invalid pointers. A pointer may not be NULL, shall be initialised
and shall not point to a memory location outside the address space allocated by or
1The terms kernel module and device driver are used synonymously within this paper.
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for the driver under consideration. A violation of this property leads to undeﬁned
behaviour. (b) Uninitialised reads. Memory cells shall be initialised before they
are read. The program's behaviour becomes undeﬁned, otherwise. (c) Violation
of memory permissions. When a program is loaded into memory, the diﬀerent seg-
ments (cf. [Tool Interface Standards (TIS) Committee, 1995]) of the program ﬁle are
assigned with diﬀerent permissions determining whether that section can be read,
written or executed. Violations of those permissions may lead to program termina-
tion and are usually a sign of erroneous pointer arithmetics. Memory permissions
are not always strictly enforced by the operating system. (d) Buﬀer overﬂows. By
buﬀer overﬂow we mean out-of-bound read and write operations to objects on heap
and stack. These errors lead to memory corruption and give way to various security
problems. (e) Memory leaks. When a program dynamically allocates memory but
loses the handle to it, the memory cannot be deallocated anymore. Memory leaks
have an especially high impact on the reliability of OS components since they are
supposed not to terminate. In a long-term execution, a device driver losing only a
few bytes of dynamically allocated heap space per operation becomes a reliability
issue. (f) Proper handling of allocation and deallocation. The Linux kernel provides
several APIs for the dynamic (de)allocation of memory. The kernel's documenta-
tion speciﬁes precisely what pairs of functions need to be employed together in order
to safely (de)allocate heap space. Furthermore it is speciﬁed that the deallocation
functions shall not be used more than once on a speciﬁc pointer unless it has been
re-allocated.
Aliasing in source code and object code. A major issue in the construction
of optimising compilers, as well as for source-code-based program analysis and ver-
iﬁcation tools, is presented by the aliasing problem. Aliasing means that a data
location in memory may be accessed through diﬀerent symbolic names in the pro-
gram. Considering the C programming language, this usually means that multiple
pointer variables in a program are referencing the same data object. Since those
aliasing relations between symbolic names and data locations often arise unexpect-
edly during program execution, they may result in erroneous program behaviours
that are particularly hard to trace and to debug.
Let us consider the C program given in Fig. 4.2. The program shows a rather
uncomfortable way of implementing an endless loop. It declares a counter i of 32 bit
length. In addition, two pointers p1 and p2 are used such that p2 points to i and
p1 to the least signiﬁcant 16 bits of i. Hence, p1 and p2 are pointing to the same
memory location. In the loop declaration (l. 8) we are now counting the data object
pointed to by p1 from 0 up to 10 while setting the data object pointed to by p2
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01 #include <stdio.h>
02 #include <sys/types.h>
03
04 int main (void) {
05 int32_t i, *p2=&i;
06 int16_t *p1=&((int16_t*) &i)[0];
07
08 for (*p1=0; *p1<10; (*p1)++)
09 { *p2=0; }
10
11 printf ("%08x: %d\n", p1, *p1);
12 printf ("%08x: %d\n", p2, *p2);
13 printf ("%08x: %d\n", &i, i);
14 return (0); }
Figure 4.2: Example for pointer aliasing in C: e_loop.c
$ gcc -O2 e_loop.c
$ ./a.out
bfc76f2c: 10
bfc76f2c: 0
bfc76f2c: 0
$ gcc -O2 e_loop.c
$ ./a.out
bfc7428c: 10
bfc7428c: 10
bfc7428c: 10
$ gcc -O1 e_loop.c
$ ./a.out
-> does not terminate
Figure 4.3: Output of the program given in Fig. 4.2 compiled with (a) gcc version
4.1.2 (left) and (b,c) gcc version 4.3.1 (right).
to 0 (l. 9) in every loop iteration. The code should loop forever and the printf()
statements in ll. 11 to 13 should never be reached. However possible behaviours of
the program are presented in Fig. 4.3.
The diﬀerent outcomes of the program execution can be explained as a result of
unsound/diﬀerent assumptions made about pointer aliasing by the developer and
the compiler, in connection with diﬀerent optimisations applied to the code. In the
ﬁrst and second case, the compiler is invoked with the option -O2, enabling several
optimisations along with the assumption that pointers of diﬀerent types do not alias
(in compliance with ISO/IEC 9899:1999).
We may now look at the same program at assembly level. Fig. 4.4 shows an
80483ba: xor %eax,%eax ;; eax := 0;
80483c4: lea -0xc(%ebp),%ebx ;; ebx := ebp - 0xc
80483c8: add $0x1,%eax ;; eax := eax + 0x00000001
80483cb: cmp $0x9,%ax ;; (ax = 9)?
80483cf: movl $0x0,-0xc(%ebp) ;; *p2 (= ebp - 0xc) := 0
80483d6: mov %ax,(%ebx) ;; *p1 (= ebx = ebp - 0xc) := ax
80483d9: jle 80483c8 ;; if (ax <= 9) goto 80483c8
Figure 4.4: Excerpt of the disassembled code from Fig. 4.3.b.
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excerpt of the assembly code obtained by disassembling the program which produced
the output shown in Fig. 4.3.b using the objdump disassembler. We can easily spot
(at instructions 80483cf and 80483d6) that p1 and p2 are indeed pointing to the same
location in memory. We can also see that *p2 is actually written before *p1. This
is unexpected when looking at the source code, but valid from the compiler's point
of view as it assumes that the two pointers do not alias. As another consequence of
this assumption, eax is never reloaded from the memory location to which p1 and
p2 point.
The above example shows that source-code-based analysis tools have to decide
for a particular semantics of the source language, which may not be the one that is
actually used by a compiler to translate the code into an executable. Hence, results
obtained by analysing the source code may not necessarily meet a program's runtime
behaviour.
While the above example motivates the analysis of compiled programs, doing so
does not provide a generic solution for dealing with pointer aliasing. Consider the
following lines of C code:
01 int i, *p1 = &i, *p2 = NULL;
02 if (condition) { p2 = &i; }
03 ...
In this case, after line 2, we cannot determine whether p1 and p2 do alias or not,
regardless of the program representation we chose. However, we may attempt to do
a path-sensitive analysis of the program and consider the path in which condition
evaluates to true and hence p1 and p2 do alias, separated from the path in which
condition does not hold. Of course this is not feasible in general as programs may
have inﬁnitely many paths. Our assumption is that for the application domain of
device drivers  relatively short programs  our approach will scale well enough
in order to ﬁnd previously unknown errors. Our results presented in Section 4.5
demonstrate that this is true.
4.2 Valgrind's Intermediate
Representation Language
A program under consideration is stored by us in an intermediate representation (IR)
borrowed from Valgrind [Nethercote and Seward, 2007], a framework for dynamic
binary instrumentation. The IR consists of a set of basic blocks containing a group
of statements such that all transfers of control to the block are to the ﬁrst statement
in the group. Once the block has been entered, all statements in the group are
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<reg> ::= <CPU register number>
<treg> ::= <Temporary register number>
<type> ::= <I8 | I16 | I32>
<statement> ::=
| <treg>:<type>
| PUT (<reg>) = <<treg>|<<val>:<type>>>
| <treg> = GET:type (<reg>)
| ST (<<treg>|<<val>:I32>>) = <<treg>|<<val>:<type>>>
| <treg> = LD:type (<<treg>|<<val>:I32>>)
| GOTO (<<treg>|<<val>:I32>>)
| IF (<treg>) <statement>
| EXIT
| <treg> = ADD:type (<<treg>|<<val>:<type>>>, <<treg>|<<val>:<type>>>)
| <treg> = AND:type (<<treg>|<<val>:<type>>>, <<treg>|<<val>:<type>>>)
| ...
| <treg> = Xor:type (<<treg>|<<val>:<type>>>, <<treg>|<<val>:<type>>>)
Figure 4.5: Basic syntax of Valgrind's IR language
executed sequentially. Hence, a basic block has exactly one entry point but may have
multiple exit points. The IR is basically a typed assembly language in static-single-
assignment form [Cytron et al., 1991; Leung and George, 1999] using temporary
registers and some memory for storing the guest state, i.e., registers available in the
CPU the program is originally compiled for.
In Valgrind's IR all arithmetic expressions, including address arithmetic, are de-
composed into simple expressions with a ﬁxed number of operands using temporary
registers for intermediate results. Furthermore, all load and store operations to
memory cells as well as to the guest state are made explicit. Hence, normalising a
program by transforming it into its IR increases the number of separate instructions
as each CPU instruction is usually expanded into multiple IR instructions. However,
this proceeding reduces the complexity of the program's representation because IR
instructions are relatively simple and free of side eﬀects.
The basic syntax of Valgrind's IR is illustrated in Fig. 4.5. The meaning of the
the diﬀerent constructs in the language is as follows:
treg:type : temporary register declaration
PUT : stores a value or the contents of a temporary register in a CPU register
GET : load a CPU register into a temporary register
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IA32 Assembly IR Instructions
xor %eax,%eax t9 = GET:I32(0) ;; t9 := eax
t8 = GET:I32(0) ;; t8 := eax
t7 = Xor32(t9,t8) ;; t7 := t9 xor t8
PUT(0) = t7 ;; eax := t7
lea -0xc(%ebp),%ebx t42 = GET:I32(20)
t41 = Add32(t42,0xFFFFFFF4:I32)
PUT(12) = t41
Figure 4.6: First two instructions of Fig. 4.4 and their respective IR instructions.
ST : stores a value or the contents of a temporary register at a heap location
identiﬁed by a value or a temporary register
LD : loads the contents of a heap location identiﬁed by a value or a temporary
register to a temporary register
GOTO : Makes program execution proceed at the program location identiﬁed by
a value or a temporary register
IF : Conditional execution of a statement if the ﬁrst parameter equals 1
EXIT : ﬁnish program execution
other operations : Apart from the instructions explained above, the IR language
consists of various statements for arithmetical operations and other transfor-
mations on temporary registers. These instructions do always have up to four
parameters. The result of the operation is stored in a previously declared
but not assigned temporary register, preserving the static single assignment
form of the IR. To give some examples, we have added the ADD and AND
instructions above. Their semantics is self-explanatory.
memory allocation : The IR does not provide mechanisms for allocating or deal-
locating objects on the heap or stack. Instead, the GOTO statement is used to
denote jumps to allocators and de-allocators provided by the operating system.
Since model checking the operating system's memory management facilities it-
self is currently not in the scope of our research, we do not translate functions
like malloc() or free() into their IR representation but provide a semantics
for the entire function call.
The example for IR instructions given in Fig. 4.6 shows that our chosen inter-
mediate representation consists of a few basic elements such as temporary registers
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IA32 Assembly IR Instructions
sub $0x8,%esp PUT(60) = 0x8048377:I32 ;; put PC
t4 = GET:I32(16) ;; get ESP into t4
t2 = Sub32(t4,0x8:I32) ;; t2 = t4 - 0x8
PUT(32) = 0x6:I32 ;; EFLAGS: operation
PUT(36) = t4 ;; EFLAGS: first operand
PUT(40) = 0x8:I32 ;; EFLAGS: second operand
PUT(16) = t2 ;; put new ESP
Figure 4.7: Valgrind IR: EFLAGS usage.
denoted with t<n>, GET and PUT statements to access machine registers iden-
tiﬁed by integers, as well as arithmetic and boolean operations such as Add, And
and Xor. Note that the latter instructions operate on temporary registers or literals
only. In addition to those statements, there are also LD and ST instructions for
loading and storing data to and from the main memory, respectively. An impor-
tant feature of the IR is that all operations and registers are typed. While machine
registers are always 8 bits long, temporary registers may have a length of 1, 8, 16,
32 or 64 bits. As a result of this, the statement t9 = GET:I32(0) means that t9
is generated by concatenating the machine registers 0 to 3. As each IR block is in
static single assignment form with respect to the temporary registers, t9 is assigned
only once within a single IR block.
Valgrind's IR takes special care of the EFLAGS register of Intel x86 microproces-
sors. The EFLAGS register is the status register of these CPUs, containing the current
state of the processor. The register may be updated by various instructions. Es-
pecially arithmetical operations may update the register's Carry, Zero and Signed
bits depending on the result of the operation. Valgrind's IR does not force the
computation of these ﬂags for each arithmetic operation. Instead, IR-instructions
storing the parameters of the last operation that may have updated the EFLAGS
register are generated so that the actual ﬂag assignment may be computed when it
is needed at a later point in program execution, i.e. for evaluating a guarded jump
statement. An example for these additional IR instructions is given in Fig. 4.7:
the IR instructions marked with the comment EFLAGS: denote the storing of the
Sub32 operation and the two operands in additional machine registers that have no
corresponding representation in actual IA32 CPUs.
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4.2.1 A semantics for Valgrind's IR
We deﬁne a simple operational semantics for for the operations in Valgrind's IR
language in terms of bit vector arithmetic.
Deﬁnition 1 (Bit Vector) A bit vector b is a vector of bits with a given length l
(or dimension):
b : {0, ..., l − 1} → {0, 1}
The set of all 2l bit vectors of length l is denoted by bvecl. The i-th bit of the bit
vector b is denoted by bi [Kroening and Strichman, 2008].
To give a semantics to the diﬀerent IR instructions we use command-state pairs
〈c, (t, r, h)〉 where c is a command (i.e. an IR instruction with its parameters) and
the triple (t, r, h) represents the program state with t holding the temporary register
assignment, r the CPU register assignment and h the current heap. As shown in Deﬁ-
nition 3, our semantics is based on three partial functions Registers, TempRegisters
and Heap representing the program state.
Deﬁnition 2 (Basic Deﬁnitions)
Types = {I1, I8, I16, I32}
Addresses = bvec32
V alues = bvec1 ∪ bvec8 ∪ bvec16 ∪ bvec32
Deﬁnition 3 (Program State)
Registers = Int→ bvec8
TempRegisters = Int→ (type ∈ Types, val ∈ V alues ∪ {⊥})
Heap = Addresses→ bvec8
States = TRegisters×Registers×Heap
Note that programs compiled for IA32 may make use of 64-bit operations and
registers. Common examples for this are Intel's Multi Media Extension (MMX)
instructions and registers. However, as the handling of those 64-bit data types is
largely equivalent to 32-bit register handling. For the sake of conciseness we omit
these types here. Of course, they are supported by the SOCA Veriﬁer. Further
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details on Intel's architecture, instructions and register layout can be found in [Intel
Corporation, 2009].
CPU register access. CPU registers are accessed via the PUT and GET instruc-
tions. The simplest case for those is probably the PUT instruction with only literal
parameters, which we use as an example for explaining our notation below.
Deﬁnition 4 (PUT with literal parameters)
〈PUT(reg) = val ∈ V alues:type ∈ Types, (t, r, h)〉
 

(t, [r|reg : val], h) if type = I8
(t, [r|〈reg..reg + 1〉 : val], h) if type = I16
(t, [r|〈reg..reg + 3〉 : val], h) if type = I32
Let us explain this deﬁnition: The PUT instruction has three parameters. The
ﬁrst of those is reg and denotes the ﬁrst CPU register we are going to write to. The
second parameter is val, the value we are going to write to reg. The last parameter
is type and tells us what size the bit vector val has, and respectively, how many
CPU registers we have to use in order to store it.
The most complicated case arises if type equals I32 and hence val has to be
handled as a bit vector of length 32. Since the CPU registers store bit vectors of
size 8, we have to store val in four of those registers such that the concatenation of
those four registers again results in val. We write
(t, r, h) (t, [r|〈reg..reg + 3〉 : val], h)
which means that only the r component of the originating (t, r, h) is updated by the
PUT instruction in such a way that after the execution of the PUT (denoted by  ),
the CPU registers reg, reg+ 1, reg+ 2 and reg+ 3 will together hold the value of
val, and hence
r(reg) ◦ r(reg + 1) ◦ r(reg + 2) ◦ r(reg + 3) = val
holds true. The ◦-operator denotes the concatenation of two bit vectors.
Similar to the above deﬁnition of the PUT instruction with a literal operand, we
can now easily give a semantics for more complicated cases such as PUT and GET
with temporary registers being used as operands:
Deﬁnition 5 (PUT with temporary registers)
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t(treg).val 6= ⊥
〈PUT(reg) = treg, (t, r, h)〉
 

(t, [r|reg : t(treg).val], h) if t(treg).type = I8
(t, [r|〈reg..reg + 1〉 : t(treg).val], h) if t(treg).type = I16
(t, [r|〈reg..reg + 3〉 : t(treg).val], h) if t(treg).type = I32
Deﬁnition 6 (GET with temporary registers)
t(treg).type = type ∧ t(treg).val = ⊥
〈treg = GET : type(reg), (t, r, h)〉
 

([t|treg.val : r(reg)], r, h) if type = I8
([t|treg.val : r(〈reg..reg + 1〉)], r, h) if type = I16
([t|treg.val : r(〈reg..reg + 3〉)], r, h) if type = I32
Byte ordering. Importantly, Valgrind provides support for multiple diﬀerent
CPU architectures including our target architecture IA32, but also Motorola's Pow-
erPC CPUs and Acorn's ARM processors. As a result, tools building upon Valgrind's
internals have to take special care in order to interpret word-aligned register and
memory access correctly. For example, the IA32 supports only the use of the little-
endian format for storing word-aligned data, which means that the least signiﬁcant
byte of a word-aligned data object is stored at the lowest address. PowerPC and
ARM, on the other hand, support both, little-endian and big-endian (most signif-
icant byte ﬁrst). However, in order to simplify logical and arithmetical operation
that are carried out on temporary registers, we want those registers to hold val-
ues in the more natural big-endian format only, leaving byte-ordering conversions
to the PUT and GET instructions, respectively. For the sake of simplicity, the se-
mantic deﬁnitions of Valgrind's IR language in this section are given for big-endian
architectures.
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Arithmetic functions. Besides PUT and GET, Valgrind's IR provides a large set
of logical and arithmetical functions ranging from negation over widening, narrow-
ing, bit-shifting and logical conjunction and disjunction to addition, multiplication
and division. All these instructions require a ﬁxed number of temporary registers
or literals as parameters and store the output in a temporary registers. Since con-
ventions for the widths of input and output bit-vectors as well as operation-speciﬁc
information, i.e. on overﬂow handling, are provided in Valgrind's public header ﬁles,
we only give an example for the ADD instruction here:
Deﬁnition 7 (ADD with temporary registers)
t(sum).type = type ∧ t(sum).val = ⊥ ∧
t(add1).val 6= ⊥ ∧ t(add2).val 6= ⊥
〈sum = ADD : type(add1, add2), (t, r, h)〉
 

([t|sum.val : (t(add1) + t(add2)) mod 28], r, h) if type = I8
([t|sum.val : (t(add1) + t(add2)) mod 216], r, h) if type = I16
([t|sum.val : (t(add1) + t(add2)) mod 232], r, h) if type = I32
In the above deﬁnition + denotes arithmetic addition of two bit-vectors. As the
resulting bit-vector is required to have the same size as the parameters, we truncate
the result using the modulo operation. Other arithmetic functions can be deﬁned
along the lines of ADD.
Memory access Memory access is similar to register access. Here, ST (store)
corresponds with PUT and LD (load) resembles the GET instruction. However, LD and
ST are used to access the main memory of the computer system. The major diﬀerence
to PUT and GET is that memory addresses are provided as 32-bit-wide parameters,
either as literals or as temporary registers whose content has been computed by
instructions preceding the current memory access. Hence, in diﬀerent executions of
the same code fragment, the location addressed by LD and ST is not static as with
PUT and GET.
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Again, we start with a simple case, namely ST with literal operands:
Deﬁnition 8 (ST with literal operands)
〈ST (addr ∈ V alues : I32) = val ∈ V alues : type, (t, r, h)〉
 

(t, r, [h|addr : val]) if type = I8
(t, r, [h|〈addr..addr + 1〉 : val]) if type = I16
(t, r, [h|〈addr..addr + 3〉 : val]) if type = I32
More commonly found are cases where temporary registers are used as parameters
to the instructions:
Deﬁnition 9 (ST with temporary registers)
t(addr).type = I32 ∧ t(addr).val 6= ⊥ ∧
t(src).val 6= ⊥
〈ST (addr) = src, (t, r, h)〉
 

(t, r, [h|t(addr).val : t(src).val]), if t(src).type = I8
(t, r, [h|〈t(addr).val..t(addr).val + 1〉 : t(src).val]) if t(src).type = I16
(t, r, [h|〈t(addr).val..t(addr).val + 3〉 : t(src).val]) if t(src).type = I32
Deﬁnition 10 (LD with temporary registers)
t(target).type = type ∧ t(target).val = ⊥ ∧
t(addr).type = I32 ∧ t(addr).val 6= ⊥
〈target = LD : type(addr), (t, r, h)〉
 

([t|target.val : h(t(addr).val)], r, h) if type = I8
([t|target.val : h(〈t(addr).val..t(addr).val + 1〉)], r, h) if type = I16
([t|target.val : h(〈t(addr).val..t(addr).val + 3〉)], r, h) if type = I32
Memory allocation and de-allocation. For supporting memory allocation and
de-allocation using APIs such as malloc() and free() as deﬁned for ANSI-C, we
extend the program state by a function HeapLocations. This function provides a
mapping from addresses to meta-information on the respective memory cell. Note
that the HeapLocations function has no meaning for the execution of the program
under consideration and does not inﬂuence its results. Instead, it provides additional
information that is usually hidden inside the operating system's memory manage-
ment facilities. Hence, the information stored here may vary with the properties to
be checked.
Symbolic Object Code Analysis 58
Deﬁnition 11 (Heap Locations)
HeapLocations = Addresses→ (alloc : Bool, init : Bool
start ∈ Addresses, size ∈ bvec32)
States = TRegisters×Registers×Heap×HeapLocations
In the context of this thesis we are interested in checking whether a particular
pointer may only point to an address that belongs to a previously allocated location
of the heap, and whether the respective memory cells have been initialised, i.e. writ-
ten to, before they are read. Furthermore the start address and size of that location
are required in order to be able to identify out-of-bounds access or invalid use of
the de-allocators provided by the runtime environment of the program. According
to Deﬁnition 11 we use alloc, init, start and size to retain the above information,
respectively. The HeapLocations is denoted wit l in the command-state pairs of
the semantic deﬁnitions given below. The command-state pair has to be extended
to 〈c, (t, r, h, l)〉.
Below we give semantic deﬁnitions for a generic allocator MALLOC and de-
allocator FREE :
Deﬁnition 12 (MALLOC)
t(addr).type = I32 ∧ t(addr).val = ⊥ ∧
t(size).type = I32 ∧ t(size).val 6= ⊥ ∧
((l(loc..(loc+t(size).val−1)).alloc = false∨ loc = 0)u loc =
0)
〈addr = GOTO MALLOC(size), (t, r, h, l)〉
 

([t|addr.val = 0], r, h, l) if t(size).val = 0 ∧ loc = 0
([t|addr.val = loc], r, h, [l|〈loc..(loc + t(size).val − 1)〉 :
(true, false, loc, t(size).val)) if t(size).val 6= 0 ∧ loc = 0
Here the u-operator denotes a non-deterministic choice between the two cases
l(loc..(loc + t(size).val − 1)).alloc = false ∨ loc = 0
success or failure due to lack of free memory or fragmentation and
loc = 0
non-deterministic failure.
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Deﬁnition 13 (FREE)
t(addr).type = I32 ∧ t(addr).val 6= ⊥
〈GOTO FREE(addr), (t, r, h, l)〉
 

(t, r, h, l) if t(addr).val = 0
(t, r, h, [l|〈t(addr).val..(t(addr).val + l(t(addr).val).size− 1)〉 :
(false, false, 0, 0)]) else
Of course, extending the deﬁnition command-state pair also requires us to provide
a new deﬁnition of the ST operation:
Deﬁnition 14 (ST with temporary registers)
t(addr).type = I32 ∧ t(addr).val 6= ⊥ ∧
t(src).val 6= ⊥
〈ST (addr) = src, (t, r, h, l)〉
 

(t, r, [h|t(addr).val : t(src).val],
[l|t(addr).val.init : true]), if t(src).type = I8
(t, r, [h|〈t(addr).val..t(addr).val + 1〉 : t(src).val],
[l|〈t(addr).val..t(addr).val + 1〉.init : true]) if t(src).type = I16
(t, r, [h|〈t(addr).val..t(addr).val + 3〉 : t(src).val],
[l|〈t(addr).val..t(addr).val + 3〉.init : true]) if t(src).type = I32
All other instructions require minor changes only as they do not perform updates to
HeapLocations. For conciseness we do not present these minor modiﬁcations here.
When looking at real operating system kernels, we will notice that there are
usually additional allocators and de-allocators available. Also functions mapping
and unmapping parts of the ﬁle system or memory from devices attached to the
system bus into the address space of the program to be analysed, are currently
considered as if they were performing allocation, de-allocation as well as initialisation
of memory cells. Furthermore, those functions may have additional parameters
identifying a particular area of the heap in which the newly allocated memory chunk
should be placed in, or control other aspects of the allocator's behaviour. For the
sake of simplicity we ignore these details here. Of course, an implementation of our
analysis framework has to account for some of those details while others may be
irrelevant with respect to the properties we want to check.
Please note that the preconditions of the semantic deﬁnitions above only consider
integrity properties of the intermediate representation. Let us for example have
another look at the LD instruction. Its preconditions are:
t(treg).type = type ∧ t(treg).val = ⊥
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We only require the type of the target register matching the type of the load
instruction and the target register not being previously initialised. The ﬁrst pre-
condition makes sure that we are neither loosing some bits of the result nor adding
uninitialised data to the program's execution. The latter condition guarantees that
the static single assignment form of the IR is preserved.
As we are reasoning about pointer safety,
t(addr).val 6= 0
would be another important safety property of the program, expressing that the
address to be dereferenced shall not hold the value NULL. However, since NULL is a
valid register assignment that solely has a special semantics with respect to pointer
operations, it is not a integrity property of the IR.
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4.3 Symbolic Execution
In this section we introduce a novel approach to verifying properties in software
components based on bounded path-sensitive symbolic execution of compiled and
linked programs as illustrated in Fig. 4.8. The basic idea behind our approach
employs well-known techniques including symbolic program execution, SMT solving
and program slicing. However, implementing it in a way that renders the techniques
scalable up to the application domain of Linux device drivers is a challenging task.
As shown in the illustration, we automatically translate a program given in its
object code into an intermediate representation (IR), borrowed from the Valgrind
binary instrumentation framework [Nethercote and Seward, 2007], by iteratively
following each program path and resolving all target addresses of computed jumps
and return statements. From the IR we generate systems of bit-vector constraints
for each execution path, which reﬂect the path-relevant register and heap contents
of the program under analysis. We then employ the Yices SMT solver [Dutertre
and de Moura, 2006] to check the satisﬁability of the resulting constraint systems
and thus the validity of the path. This approach also allows us to add in a range of
pointer safety properties, e.g., whether a pointer points to an allocated address, as
simple assertions over those constraint systems.
In contrast to other methods for software veriﬁcation, our technique does not
employ program abstraction but only path-sensitive and heap-aware program slicing,
which means that our slices are not computed over the entire program but only over
a particular path during execution. Furthermore, we do not consider the heap as
one big data object but compute slices with respect to those heap locations that are
data-ﬂow dependents of a location in a program path for which a property is being
checked. A safe over-approximation is used for computing these slices. In addition,
our technique leaves most of the program's input (initially) unspeciﬁed in order to
allow the SMT solver to search for subtle inputs that will drive the program into an
error state. Obviously, our analysis by symbolic execution cannot be complete: the
search space has to be bounded since the total number of execution paths and the
number of instructions per path in a program is potentially inﬁnite. However, our
experimental results will show that this boundedness is not a restriction in practice:
many programs are relatively shallow and may still be analysed either exhaustively
or up to an acceptable depth.
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Figure 4.8.a: Starting from a given function entry point, each instruction is translated into IR.
Figure 4.8.b: In order to construct paths, the IR is systematically traversed in depth-ﬁrst fashion
up to a certain width and and depth.
Figure 4.8: Illustration of the SOCA technique.
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Figure 4.8.c: To decide which paths of the program are feasible, assertions are generated at
decision points. For program statements facilitating memory access, we also generate assertions
expressing the relevant pointer-safety properties at this instruction.
Figure 4.8.d : For each assertion we compute a path-sensitive program slicing containing only
those program statements that aﬀect the decision variable or pointer, and hence are required for
checking the satisﬁability of assertions.
Figure 4.8: Illustration of the SOCA technique.
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Figure 4.8.e: The slice and assertions are translated into a bit-vector constraint problem, which
then checked for satisﬁability by invoking the Yices SMT solver.
Figure 4.8: Illustration of the SOCA technique.
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Using the operational semantics for Valgrind's IR language as outlined in the
previous section, we are now able to translate IR instructions into bit-vector con-
straint systems for Yices2 [Dutertre and de Moura, 2006]. Given that the IR is in
static single assignment form we can simply translate an instruction such as the ﬁrst
PUT statement from Fig. 4.6 as follows:
IR Instruction Constraint Representation
PUT(0) = t7 (define r0::(bitvector 8)(bv-extract 31 24 t7))
(define r1::(bitvector 8)(bv-extract 23 16 t7))
(define r2::(bitvector 8)(bv-extract 15 8 t7))
(define r3::(bitvector 8)(bv-extract 7 0 t7))
Note that the CPU registers are assigned in reverse byte order, i.e. with the
least signiﬁcant 8 bits in r0 and the most signiﬁcant bits in r3, to the temporary
registers. That is because the above constraints are generated from a binary com-
piled for IA32 which uses this particular encoding, while arithmetic expressions in
Yices are implemented for bit-vectors that have the most signiﬁcant bit at position
0. Since access operations to the guest state may be 8, 16, 32 or 64 bit aligned, we
have to use two diﬀerent encodings here.
Similar to the PUT instruction we can express GET or the Xor and Add in-
structions in terms of bit-vector constraints for Yices:
IR Instruction Constraint Representation
t9 = GET:I32(0) (define t9::(bitvector 32) (bv-concat
(bv-concat r3 r2) (bv-concat r1 r0))
t7 = Xor32(t9,t8) (define t7::(bitvector 32) (bv-xor t9 t8))
t41 = Add32(t42,
0xFFFFFFF4:I32)
(define t41::(bitvector 32)
(bv-add t42 (mk-bv 32 4294967284)
Since our analysis handles loops by unrolling them while exploring a path, a
single instruction might appear multiple times in that path. Furthermore, the IR is
in static single assignment form only with respect to the temporary registers within a
2The syntax of Yices' input language is explained at http://yices.csl.sri.com/.
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single IR block. Hence, we have to be more precise when generating variable names.
The rule applied by the implementation of our technique appends the instruction's
location and the invocation number to each variable.
While the translation method explained above can be applied for operations
working on registers and temporary registers only, it cannot be used for operations
accessing the heap or stack. To explain this, let us consider the two IR statements:
01 STle(t5) = t32
02 t31 = LDle:I32(t7)
The semantics of those two statements is quite similar to that of PUT and
GET. In order to be as close as possible to the actual IA32 architecture, we deﬁne
the underlying memory representation as an array of memory cells of eight bits each
that are accessed using an index of 32 bit length. Now we can deﬁne that the ST
will update the memory cells indexed by t5..t5 + 3 by storing the value held by
the 32-bit-wide temporary register t32. Of course, in order to do this, t32 needs to
be disassembled into 8-bit-wide bit-vectors in the same way as shown for the PUT
instruction above. Respectively, the LD instruction will write the concatenation of
the memory cells indexed by t7..t7 + 3 to t31. Byte ordering issues apply in the
same way as explained for register access above.
The main diﬀerence of these instructions to PUT and GET is that the target of
the store or the source of the load instruction is variable and may be computed at
runtime. In order to include these statements in our symbolic execution framework
we have to express them in a very ﬂexible way in order to allow the SMT solver to
identify cases in which safety properties are violated.
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Our representation of the main memory in Yices is that of a function from 32 bit
wide bit-vectors (the pointer) to bit-vectors of size 8 (the memory cell, respectively).
We write:
(define heap::(-> (bitvector 32) (bitvector 8)))
Now the above store instruction can be expressed as an update of that function:
(define heap.0::(-> (bitvector 32) (bitvector 8))
(update heap ((bv-add t5 (mk-bv 32 3))) (bv-extract 7 0 t32)))
(define heap.1::(-> (bitvector 32) (bitvector 8))
(update heap.0 ((bv-add t5 (mk-bv 32 2))) (bv-extract 15 8 t32)))
(define heap.2::(-> (bitvector 32) (bitvector 8))
(update heap.1 ((bv-add t5 (mk-bv 32 1))) (bv-extract 23 16 t32)))
(define heap.3::(-> (bitvector 32) (bitvector 8))
(update heap.2 ((bv-add t5 (mk-bv 32 0))) (bv-extract 31 24 t32)))
Constraints for the load instruction are generated analogous to theGET as explained
above.
Encoding safety assertions. Being able to translate the entire program into
constraints makes it rather easy to express our properties given in Section 4.1 in
terms of assertions on the resulting constraint systems. The simplest case for such
an assertion is a null-pointer check. For the store instruction in the above example,
we could state this assertion as:
(assert (= t5 (mk-bv 32 0)))
If the resulting constraint system is satisﬁable, Yices will return an evidence, i.e.
a possible input assignment that will drive the program into a state in which t5 will
be NULL at the above program point.
However, most memory safety properties require additional information to be
known about the program's current execution context. In particular, answering the
question whether a pointer may point to an invalid memory area requires us to
know, which cells are currently allocated. We retain this information by adding a
function named HeapLocations to our model that is updated whenever memory is
allocated or de-allocated:
(define heaploc::(-> (bitvector 32) (record alloc::bool init::bool
start::(bitvector 32) size::(bitvector 32))))
We can now express a property saying that the pointer t5 has to point to an
allocated address at the program point where it is dereferenced as:
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(assert (= (select (heaploc t5) alloc) false))
All other properties mentioned in Section 4.1 may be expressed along the lines
of those two examples. Most of them require further additional information, such
as the API that has been used to allocate or deallocate some memory cells, to be
added to the HeapLocations function. In order to reduce the size and search space
of the resulting constraint systems, we check assertions one-by-one with a specialised
HeapLocations function for each property.
Symbolic execution. The core component of our symbolic execution framework
translates a given program starting from some entry point into its intermediate
representation and then into bit-vector constraints. There are three cases in which
we have to call Yices in order to check the generated constraints for satisﬁability:
(a) a given statement is a computed jump, e.g. goto t7 or a function return. In
those cases we have to compute the target address of the jump or return statement
in order to be able to continue analysing this path of the program. (b) the statement
contains a guard for a jump statement, e.g. if (t13) goto 0x80483C8:I32. Here
we have to check whether the guarding condition may evaluate to true or false in
order to be able to follow only branches for which the guard is satisﬁable. (c) The
last and most interesting case occurs when a temporary register is dereferenced as a
pointer, e.g. STle(t7) = t12. In that case we want to check whether our memory
safety assertions are satisﬁable. This is done as described above.
However, in any case we do not run Yices on an entire path's constraint system.
Instead we compute a path-sensitive slice of that path. Program slicing, introduced
in [Weiser, 1981], is a technique for automatically selecting only those parts of a
program that may aﬀect the values computed at some point of interest, based on its
control and data ﬂow. Within the last years, various slicing techniques have been
developed. A comprehensive survey on these techniques is given in [Tip, 1994]. The
approach to program slicing used in this paper employs a slicing algorithm based
on program dependence graphs as introduced in [Ottenstein and Ottenstein, 1984]
and extended for slicing multi-procedure programs in [Horwitz et al., 1990], using
the notion of a system dependence graph. In diﬀerence to conventional slicing as
discussed above, our slices are computed over a single path instead of the entire
program's control ﬂow. In that aspect, our approach to program slicing is similar
to what has been introduced as dynamic slicing in [Korel and Laski, 1990] and
path slicing in [Jhala and Majumdar, 2005]. By contrast with those approaches'
methods, we use conventional slicing criteria (L, var) denoting a variable var that
is used at program location L. Slicing criteria for dynamic slicing and path slicing
are given in terms of a well deﬁned input to a program or a (potentially infeasible)
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counterexample trace, as well as a location of interest and a set of variables. In
diﬀerence to that, our approach aims to compute inputs that will lead to a particular
path being executed. Hence, we leave the program's input initially unspeciﬁed. The
slice is then computed by collecting all statements of which var is data dependent by
tracing the path backwards, starting from L up to the program entry point. While
collecting ﬂow dependencies is relatively easy for programs that do only use CPU
registers (and temporary registers in our IR), it becomes diﬃcult when dependencies
to the heap and stack are involved.
Handling memory access in slicing. Let us have a second look at the LD and
ST statements from page 66. In order to compute a small slice for (02, t31) we have
to know whether the store statement in l. 1 may aﬀect the value of t31, i.e., whether
t5 and t7may alias. We obtain this information by using Yices to iteratively compute
the potential address range that can be accessed through t5. This is done by making
Yices compute an evidence, i.e. a possible assignment, e for t5, and the computing
further evidences e′ such that e > e′ or e < e′ holds, until the range is explored.
Of course this is an over-approximation as not the entire range may be addressable
by the pointer. However, using this abstraction presents a trade-oﬀ concerning only
the computation of minimal slices. That means, instead of computing and storing
all satisfying assignments for a particular pointer (232 in the worst case), we are able
to keep the number of Yices runs as well as the amount of data to store small. As
a drawback, our technique may produce unnecessarily large slices in the presence of
symbolic pointers. Nevertheless, our approach is conservative with respect to the
property to be veriﬁed.
We store those ranges in a memory tree, an idea borrowed from [Ferdinand et al.,
2007], a model handling memory accesses and their access widths dynamically. The
approach uses a binary tree structure where each node is labelled with an interval
denoting the boundaries of the memory cells it represents. A leaf is labelled with a
set of points denoting the program points deﬁning the memory cells represented by
the leaf.
By computing the address range possibly accessed by a pointer used in a load
statement, i.e. t7 in our case, and traversing the memory tree looking for memory
intervals overlapping with the range of t7, we can now determine which store oper-
ations may aﬀect the result of the load operation. Despite being conservative when
computing address ranges, our experience shows that most memory access opera-
tions end up having very few dependencies as most pointers evaluate to a concrete
address and not a range.
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4.4 Complications and Optimisations
Handling computed jumps. A major issues when analysing compiled programs
arises from the extensive use of code pointers and jump target computations. While
most source-code based approaches simply ignore function pointers, this cannot be
done when analysing object since code jump computations are too widely used here.
Two examples for this are:
01 ;; Return statement:
02 t8 = GET:I32(16)
03 t9 = LDle:I32(t8)
04 t26 = Add32(t8,0x4:I32)
05 PUT(16) = t26
06 goto {Return} t9
01 ;; Call to a library function:
02 t0 = LDle:I32(0x80495D8:I32)
03 goto {Call} t0
In both cases the target address of the jump has to be loaded from the memory
and may diﬀer in multiple invocations of the same instruction from diﬀerent program
contexts. In our approach, jump target addresses are determined in the same way
as addresses for load and store operations. This is done by computing slices for
(06, t9) or (03, t0) for the return statement or the function call, respectively and
then iteratively computing the address ranges for the two pointers.
If Yices returns only one possible target address, we extend the program's control
ﬂow representation and the current path dynamically with the instruction blocks
reachable for that target. On the other hand, if t9 or t0 are symbolic pointers, we
terminate the path at this point since following each possible address would lead
to an explosion in the number of paths, and also to unsound results since many
pointer assignments may be due to missing information in the initial memory state,
and hence may actually be infeasible in practice. However, the latter case happens
rarely, practically only in case a function to be analysed gets a function pointer
passed as its argument. We show in Section 4.5 that only a small percentage of
drivers of our sample exhibit this behaviour, while the majority of drivers can be
analysed exhaustively despite this limitation.
Optimising GET and PUT statements. One major problem with respect to
the scalability of our approach arises from the vast number of GET and PUT state-
ments shown in Fig. 4.6. The reason for this is in our adaptation of Valgrind's IR:
temporary registers are usually stored in the guest state at the end of each CPU
instruction and may be reloaded in several following instructions. In fact, Valgrind
is able to optimise the IR in a way that removes a majority of those statements.
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However, in order to simplify the handling of jumps, we decided to turn this optimi-
sation oﬀ. This allows each IR block to be entered at various points and hence saves
us time and memory for translating and maintaining multiple IR blocks holding sub-
sets of the instructions of another block. However the frequent de- and re-composing
of temporary registers into 8-bit-wide guest-state registers and back into temporary
registers introduces lots of additional variables in the SMT solver and makes it run
out of memory rather quickly.
An eﬃcient way around this issue is to optimise unnecessary GET and PUT
operations away based on the actual path we are analysing. Let us look at another
piece of IR obtained from the example program shown in Fig. 4.4:
;; 0x80483cb (cmp)
t25 = GET:I16(0)
IR-NoOp
PUT(32) = 0x5:I32
t43 = 16Uto32(t25)
PUT(36) = t43
PUT(40) = 0x9:I32
PUT(44) = 0x0:I32
...
;; 0x80483d9 (jle)
t49 = GET:I32(32)
t50 = GET:I32(36)
t51 = GET:I32(40)
t52 = GET:I32(44)
t53 = x86g_calculate_condition[mcx=0x13]
{0x808c940}(0xE:I32,t49,t50,t51,t52):I32
t48 = 32to1(t53)
if (t48) goto {Boring} 0x80483C8:I32
We see that the cmp instruction is decomposed into several instructions. Four of
those are PUT statements storing values to registers of the guest state. The same
registers are read by the GET statements at the beginning of the jle instruction
and there are no further write operations to these registers in between, while the
temporary registers are in static single assignment form in any case. However, we
can also see that the temporary registers written to the guest state have the same
size as the ones that are read; hence they will hold the same values and no byte-
ordering conversions are required. Hence, we may simply remove the aﬀected PUT
and GET statements by assigning, for example t50 = t43, or go even further and
replace the temporary register t50 in the x86g_calculate_condition statement with
t43.
There are several cases where this optimisation is not possible. Examples for this
are code sequences in which a 32-bit value is written to the guest state and a 16-bit
value is read at a later point in the program ﬂow from the same register. In those
cases the changes of the byte-ordering performed by PUT and GET operations are
required to preserve the semantics of the program we are analysing.
Practical results show that this simple optimisation reduces the memory con-
sumption of Yices for large constraint systems (> 10,000 constraints) by up to 90%.
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Hence it prevents a large quantity of Yices runs from terminating without returning
a result due to timeouts or memory exhaustion.
Determining a valid initial memory state. Another challenge when imple-
menting symbolic execution as an SMT problem is given by the enormous search
space that may result from leaving the program's initial memory state undeﬁned.
As a result, the SMT solver tends to run out of memory regularly, or slows down
the whole analysis. Furthermore, even unsound results in pointer computations are
possible as those regularly employ ﬁxed values taken from the initial heap or stack
of the binary program.
To make our approach scale to the desired application domain, we compute an
initial memory tree from the information given in the device driver's object code. For
all loadable program sections assigned in the binary (cf. [Tool Interface Standards
(TIS) Committee, 1995]), we create leave nodes in the memory dependency tree as
explained in Section 4.3. If our analysis determines that a particular address or
range of addresses is accessed by a pointer within a slice, we generate constraints for
the initial memory cell assignment of that particular range of addresses and prepend
them to the constraints in the slice before passing the entire constraint system to
the SMT solver.
As we explain in Chapter 5, OS components including functions taken from de-
vice drivers, make regularly use of an external data environment consisting of heap
objects allocated and initialised by other modules of the OS. Hence, this data envi-
ronment cannot be inferred from the information available in the program binary. In
Chapter 5 we show that data environments can easily be embedded into the analysis
by adding just a few lines of C code as a preamble to our analysis. However, doing
so requires one to have speciﬁc knowledge of the employed data objects employed
by a function to be analysed. Hence, doing so is not a diﬃcult task in general but
could not be done for the large number of functions analysed in Section 4.5. As a
result of this, our analysis reports higher ratios of false-positive errors than initially
expected.
4.5 Experimental Results
In order to evaluate the SOCA technique with respect to its ability to correctly
identify pointer safety issues as well as to evaluate its performance when analysing
operating system components, the SOCA Veriﬁer, which implements our technique,
was developed. In this section we outline the SOCA Veriﬁer's architecture and report
on extensive experiments conducted by applying the SOCA veriﬁer to a benchmark
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Figure 4.9: Software architecture of the SOCA Veriﬁer
suite for software model checkers as well as to a large set of Linux device drivers.
4.5.1 Tool Development
The current implementation of the SOCA Veriﬁer is written in C, mainly for fa-
cilitating integration with Valgrind's VEX library (cf. [Nethercote and Seward,
2007], [Valgrind, 2009]). In Fig. 4.9 we outline the Veriﬁers software architecture.
The components developed for this thesis are those labelled as SOCA Core com-
ponents, comprising of a total of 15,000 lines of code (LOC). We interface with
three external components that are used for parsing binary program ﬁles in the
ELF format (libELF, [Koshy, 2009]), translating CPU instructions into IR (Val-
grind's VEX Library, [Valgrind, 2009]) and for solving bit-vector constraint prob-
lems (Yices, [Dutertre and de Moura, 2006]). All these components are available
for multitude of diﬀerent computer architectures. Hence, we believe that the SOCA
Veriﬁer can be easily adapted to check programs for platforms other than IA32.
As shown in Fig. 4.9, the core components of the SOCA Veriﬁer comprise a
Program Flow Analyser, a Slicer, a Constraint Generator and a Constraint Opti-
miser. The Program Flow Analyser is the central component of our tool. It consists
of about 4300 LOC implementing the systematic traversal of the object code in a
depth-ﬁrst manner, passing every instruction reachable from a given program entry
point to the VEX library in order to obtain its IR. The Flow Analyser then iden-
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tiﬁes control dependencies and data dependencies for each IR statement based on
traditional data ﬂow analysis (cf. [Nielson et al., 1999]), and generates assertions
for branching conditions and pointer dereferences. The assertions are then used as
slicing criteria by the Slicer (1400 LOC), which computes a path-slice for the slicing
criterion with respect to the path currently analysed. Slices are passed to the Con-
straint Generator and further to the Constraint Optimiser which transform the IR
statements of a slice into bit-vector constraints for Yices as explained above. These
two components are the biggest part of the SOCA Veriﬁer, consisting of 5800 LOC
which is due to the multitude of diﬀerent IR instructions that have to be translated
into constraints.
For the purpose of analysing operating system components, our implementation
of the Constraint Generator is fairly complete with respect to the supported IR
statements. We currently support 74 out of about 110 instructions commonly used
in optimised driver binaries. Floating point arithmetic (which is not used within the
Linux kernel), operations working on 64-bit registers and a large number of CPU
extensions recently integrated into IA32 processors for multimedia acceleration, are
largely unsupported at the moment. However, with the existing tool framework we
have available implementing a new CPU instruction usually takes not more than
30 LOC and can be done within hours. Hence, we believe that our tool can easily
be completed and even extended to cope with new application domains such as
analysing application level programs rather than operating system components.
4.5.2 Small Benchmarks: Verisec
For enabling qualitative comparison of our technique with other tools we applied the
SOCA veriﬁer to the Verisec benchmark suite [Ku et al., 2007]. Verisec consists of
298 test cases (149 faulty programs and 149 corresponding ﬁxed programs) for buﬀer
overﬂow vulnerabilities taken from various open source programs. These test cases
are given in terms of C source code and provide a conﬁgurable buﬀer size, set to 4
in the experiments conducted by us. The test cases had to be compiled to binaries
using gcc in order to be analysed by the SOCA veriﬁer. In previous work [Kroening
et al., 2008; Ku et al., 2007] the benchmark suite has been used to evaluate the
C-code model checkers SatAbs [Clarke et al., 2005] and LoopFrog [Kroening et al.,
2008]. For comparison of our technique, we use the metrics proposed in [Zitser et al.,
2004]3: in Table 4.1 we report the detection rate R(d), the false positive rate R(f)
and the discrimination rate R(¬f |d). The latter is deﬁned as the ratio of test cases
for which an error is correctly reported, while it is, also correctly, not reported in
3We do not use Zitser's test suite as it is not publicly available.
Symbolic Object Code Analysis 75
Table 4.1: Detection rate R(d), false positive rate R(f) and discrimination rate
R(¬f |d) for SatAbs, LoopFrog and SOCA
R(d) R(f) R(¬f |d)
SatAbs (from [Ku, 2008]) 0.36 0.08 n/a
LoopFrog (from [Kroening et al., 2008]) 1.0 0.26 0.74
SOCA 0.66 0.23 0.81
the corresponding ﬁxed test case. Hence tools are penalised for not ﬁnding bugs,
but also for not reporting a ﬁxed program as safe.
As the above table shows, our technique reliably detects the majority of buﬀer
overﬂow errors in the benchmarking suite. However, our detection rate is still lower
than the one reported for the LoopFrog tool. An explanation for this can be found
in the nature of the given test cases: in most test cases, static arrays are declared
together with other program variables at the beginning of a main() function. This
program setup renders the benchmarking suite easily comprehensible for source-code
based veriﬁcation tools since the bounds of the diﬀerent data objects are clearly
visible in the source-code representation. However, in the object code obtained by
compiling the test case, the boundaries of data objects are not visible anymore. For
example, an array consisting of four one-byte elements followed by a 32-bit index
variable results in an 8-byte data section in the binary only, making it virtually
impossible to discriminate between the array and the index variable. While source-
code based techniques may be able to identify an overﬂow error in this scenario as
soon as the array is accessed at a position greater than three, the SOCA technique
will only be able to notice it when an access exceeding the bounds of the program's
data segment (i.e. at indices greater than 7) occurs. This renders our tool less
eﬃcient for analysing programs with small, statically declared buﬀers.
However, the SOCA technique still shows a lower false positive rate and a better
discrimination rate than the other tools. Remarkable is also that the SOCA veriﬁer
failed for only four cases of the Verisec suite: once due to memory exhaustion and
three times due to unimplemented features in our tool which can easily be added by
investing more development eﬀorts. According to Ku [Ku, 2008], the SatAbs tool
crashed in 73 three cases and timed out in another 87 cases. Ku's experiments were
conducted with a timeout of 30 minutes. As shown in Fig. 4.10.a, the runtime of
the SOCA veriﬁer exceed this time in only 7 cases.
Despite having used a benchmark suite providing examples which are in favour of
source-code analysis, our results show that object-code analysis as implemented in
the SOCA Veriﬁer can compete with state-of-the-art source-code checkers. However,
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Figure 4.10: Performance results for the Verisec suite. Left: (a) numbers of test
cases veriﬁed by time. Right: (b) numbers of constraint systems solved by time.
as our tool analysis object code, it can be employed in a much wider application
domain. Unfortunately, benchmarking suites that include dynamic allocation and
provide examples of pointer safety errors other than buﬀer overﬂows are, to our
knowledge, not available.
In addition to the above comparison with other veriﬁcation tools, Fig. 4.10 gives
an overview of the SOCA Veriﬁer's general performance for small-scale programs.
Fig. 4.10.a shows the CPU times consumed for analysing the diﬀerent test cases in
the Verisec suite. It can be seen that the vast majority of test cases is analysed
within less than three minutes per test case. Only in 38 cases this time is exceeded
due to extensive loop unrolling. However, as presented in Table 4.2, the average
computation time consumed per test case is 18.5 minutes. In total, about 92 CPU
hours have been used. Employing a 16-core compute box with 2.3 GHz clock speed
per CPU and a total of 256 GB of RAM, the experiment was conducted in about 6
hours.
In Fig. 4.10.b we show the behaviour of Yices for solving the constraint systems
generated by the SOCA Veriﬁer. For the Verisec suite, a total of 11,994,834 con-
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Table 4.2: Performance statistics for the Verisec suite
average standard min max total
deviation
per test case
total runtime 18m30s 1h33m 162ms 15h21m 91h54m
slicing time 28s150ms 41s808ms 28ms 5m15s 2h19m
Yices time 17m59s 1h33m 110ms 15h20m 89h19m
no. of CS 4025.11 173.76 11 8609 11994834
pointer operations 8.73 37.74 4 242 2603
per Yices invocation
runtime 267ms 4s986ms 1ms 5m 88h59m
CS size 891.64 7707.95 0 368087
memory usage 6.82MB 46.54MB 3.81MB 2504.36MB
straint systems are solved in 89 hours. With the timeout for Yices set to 5 minutes,
the solver timed out for 34 constraint systems, while 96% of the generated constraint
systems were solved in less than one second. A total of 2,250,878 (19%) constraint
systems is used to express veriﬁcation properties, while the other constraint systems
were required to correctly follow the program's control ﬂow, i.e., to decide branching
conditions and resolve computed jumps. Again, average timings, constraint system
sizes and memory consumptions are given in Table 4.2.
4.5.3 Large-Scale Benchmarks:
Linux Device Drivers
In order to evaluate the performance and scalability of the SOCA Veriﬁer, a large set
of 9296 functions originating from 250 Linux device drivers of version 2.6.26 of the
Linux OS compiled for IA32, is analysed. The selection criterion for the drivers is
to consider only those drivers that require only functionality provided by the kernel
and not by other drivers. This selection has been made because our tool chain does
currently not support analysing multiple drivers at once, however, implementing
this feature should be trivial.
The tool chain used in our experiments employs nm to obtain a list function
symbols present in the .text section of a given device driver object. The driver
object is then statically linked against the Linux kernel to resolve undeﬁned symbols
in the driver, i.e., functions provided by the OS kernel that are called by the driver's
functions. The SOCA technique is then applied on the resulting binary ﬁle to analyse
each of the driver's functions separately.
While our technique is in principle capable of tracing into all functions called by
Symbolic Object Code Analysis 78
the target function, there are a few cases where we decided not to do so. Instead,
the current implementation of the SOCA technique provides a set of built-in in-
strumentations for certain functions of the kernel. The rationale behind this is that
various functions used by the driver perform I/O operations that have no meaning
with respect to the analysis since we do not include a model of the underlying phys-
ical devices a driver is supposed to operate in our symbolic execution runs. The
most common example for this are the printk() function, the kernel's equivalent
for printf(), which is used to write out messages. Our instrumentation of this
function does only dereference all given parameters and checks the alignments and
null-termination of strings the parameters point to. However, the code that actually
prints the message is omitted. A second group of functions we provide instrumen-
tations for, are those used for memory (de-)allocation. That is because the diﬀerent
(de-)allocation APIs provided by the kernel are assumed to behave the same with
respect to our heap model. Furthermore, functions like mmap() are considered as
simple memory allocation as well. Finally, all functions inﬂuencing the concurrent
behaviour of a driver are replaced with stubs as well. That is because calls to the
scheduler or the locking of resources are irrelevant for the sequential program execu-
tions our work focuses on. As most locking APIs get a pointer to a particular lock
passed as their arguments, we do check the validity of those pointers. Our instru-
mentations are done on the level of the IR, and hence no source code is required to
perform the analysis of any given function.
The bounds for the SOCA Veriﬁer were set to a maximum of 1000 paths to
be analysed, where a single instruction may appear at most 1000 times per path,
thereby eﬀectively bounding the number of loop iterations or recursions to that
depth. The Yices SMT solver was set to a timeout of 300 seconds per invocation.
General results. Our test suite consists of a total of 9296 functions taken from
250 Linux device drivers. The promising result of our work is that 95.3% of the
functions in the sample could be analysed without failure in our tool chain. In
67.5% of the sample the exhaustion of execution bounds led to an early termination
of the analysis. However, the analysis reached a considerable depth in those cases,
analysing paths with a length of up to 22,577 CPU instructions. Most interestingly,
27.8% of those functions could be analysed exhaustively. Here exhaustiveness means,
that none of the bounds regarding the number of paths, the path length or the SMT
solver's timeout where ever reached. As shown in Fig. 4.11.a, in the majority of
cases, our analysis returns a result in less than 10 min, while the constraint systems
generated by our tool can usually be solved in less than 500 ms, and the timeout
for Yices (set to 5 min) is hardly ever reached (cf. 4.11.b). The analysis was
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Figure 4.11: Performance results for the Kernel modules. Left: (a) numbers of test
cases veriﬁed by time. Right: (b) numbers of constraint systems solved by time.
carried out on a 1.5 GHz 8-core PC with and 12 GB of RAM and on a 16-core
PC with 2.3 GHz clock frequency and 256 GB of RAM. As we were not exclusively
using these machines  especially the 16-core PC was under heavy loads from other
experiments, we cannot determine the total CPU-hours used by our experiments and
all measures presented here are absolute times measured by our tool and Yices that
may include sleep times due to scheduling. The total time consumed for conducting
our experiment amounts to 9058 hours, we assume that this is equivalent to about
4500 CPU-hours on exclusively used machines.
In 0.98% (91 functions) of the sample functions our tool may have produced
unsound results due to non-linear arithmetic in the generated constraint systems,
which is currently not decidable by Yices. Our SOCA Veriﬁer failed in 5.6% (522
functions) of the cases due to memory exhaustion, missing support for particular
instructions or functions in our tool or Valgrind, as well as due to crashes of Yices.
We believe that all those issues can be solved by investing substantial eﬀort in tool
development.
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Table 4.3: Performance statistics for the Kernel modules
average standard min max total
deviation
per test case
total runtime 58m28s 7h56m 21ms 280h48m 9058h32m
slicing time 8m35s 2h13m 0 95h39m 1329h46m
Yices time 48m36s 7h28m 0 280h30m 7531h51m
no. of CS 3591.14 9253.73 0 53449 33383239
pointer operations 99.53 312.64 0 4436 925277
no. of paths 67.50 221.17 1 1000 627524
max path lengths 727.22 1819.28 1 22577
per Yices invocation
runtime 845ms 8s765ms 1ms 5m2s 8295h56m
CS size 4860.20 20256.77 0 7583410
Memory usage 5.75MB 14.76MB 3.81MB 3690.00MB
Error reports and false positives. In this case study, our analysis of the device
drivers is focused on identifying possible null-pointer dereferences. The SOCA Veri-
ﬁer revealed a total of 887 program locations at which a pointer may hold the value
NULL when it is dereferenced. Since our approach is based on unrolling loops, it may
report a single error location multiple times, namely as often as the loop is unrolled.
For the results presented here, the bound for loop unrolling is set to 1000  indeed,
in a few cases, a single program location was reported up to 1000 times. The SOCA
veriﬁer issued a total of 472,351 warnings during the experiment conducted here.
However, only a small subset of these error traces has been analysed in detail yet.
That is because doing so currently requires one to manually establish a mapping
from the error trace and heap content reported by our tool and with respect to the
program's object code representation, to the source code and then decide whether
the reported initial heap state may actually be generated by the execution environ-
ment the function under analysis may be executed in. In general this is comprises
of several hours of work per program trace, which is currently not automated at all.
Provided that many functions utilised in this case study make use of external data
environments that have not modelled explicitly (i.e. not as in Chapter 5), this case
study can be expected to show a substantially higher false-positive-rate than the
comparison using the Verisec suite in Section 4.5.2.
Chapter 5
Beyond Pointer Safety:
The Linux Virtual File System
In the context of the grand challenge proposed to the program veriﬁcation com-
munity by Hoare [Hoare, 2003], a mini challenge of building a veriﬁable ﬁle system
(FS) as a stepping stone was presented by Joshi and Holzmann [Joshi and Holzmann,
2007]. As FSs are vital components of operating system kernels, bugs in their code
can have disastrous consequences. Unhandled failure may render all application-level
programs unsafe and gives way to serious security problems.
In this chapter, we apply an analytical approach to verifying an implementation
of the Virtual File System (VFS) layer [Bovet and Cesati, 2005] within the Linux
operating system kernel, using our novel, automated Symbolic Object-Code Analysis
(SOCA) technique explained in Chapter 4. As described in Section 5.1, the VFS
layer is of particular interest since it provides support for implementing concrete
FSs such as EXT3 and ReiserFS [Bovet and Cesati, 2005], and encapsulates the
details on top of which C POSIX libraries are deﬁned; such libraries in turn provide
functions, e.g., open and remove, that facilitate ﬁle access. Our case study aims
at checking for violations of API usage rules and memory properties within VFS,
and equally at assessing the feasibility of our SOCA technique to reliably analysing
intricate operating system components such as the Linux VFS implementation. We
are particularly interested in ﬁnding out to what degree the automatic veriﬁcation
of complex properties involving pointer safety and the correct usage of locking APIs
within VFS is possible.1
Since the Linux VFS implementation consists of more than 65k lines of complex
C code including inlined assembly and linked dynamic data structures, its veriﬁca-
tion is not supported by current software model checkers such as BLAST [Henzinger
1Doing so is in the remit of Joshi and Holzmann's mini challenge: researchers could choose
any of several existing open-source ﬁlesystems and attempt to verify them [Joshi and Holzmann,
2007].
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et al., 2002a] and CBMC [Clarke et al., 2004]. Thus, previous work by us focused on
the question whether and how an appropriate model of the VFS can be reverse engi-
neered from its implementation, and whether meaningful veriﬁcation results can be
obtained using model checking on the extracted model [Galloway et al., 2009]. This
proved to be a challenging task since automated techniques for extracting models
from C source code do not deal with important aspects of operating system code, in-
cluding macros, dynamic memory allocation, function pointers, architecture-speciﬁc
and compiler-speciﬁc code and inlined assembly. Much time was spent in [Galloway
et al., 2009] on extracting a model by hand and validating this model via reviews and
simulation runs, before it could be proved to respect data-integrity properties and to
be deadlock-free using the SMART model checker [Ciardo et al., 2006]. Our SOCA
technique addresses these shortcomings, providing automated veriﬁcation support
that does away with manual modelling and ad-hoc pointer analysis.
Figure 5.1: VFS environment and data structures, where arcs denote pointers.
5.1 The Linux Virtual File System
This section introduces the Linux FS architecture and, in particular, the Virtual File
System layer; the reader is referred to [Bovet and Cesati, 2005] for a more detailed
description. An overview of the VFS internals and data structures is presented in
Fig. 5.1.
The Linux FS architecture consists of multiple layers. The most abstract is the
application layer which refers to the user programs; this is shown as process in Fig.
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5.1. Its functionality is constructed on top of the ﬁle access mechanisms oﬀered by
the C POSIX library, which provides functions facilitating ﬁle access as deﬁned by
the POSIX Standard, e.g., open ﬁle open(), delete ﬁle remove(), make directory
mkdir() and remove directory rmdir(). The next lower layer is the system call
interface which propagates requests for system resources from applications in user
space to the kernel, e.g., to the VFS.
The Virtual File System layer is an indirection layer, providing the data struc-
tures and interfaces needed for system calls related to a standard Unix FS. It deﬁnes
a common interface that allows many kinds of speciﬁc FSs to coexist, and enables the
default processing needed to maintain the internal representation of a FS. The VFS
runs in a highly concurrent environment as its interface functions may be invoked
by multiple, concurrently executing application programs. Therefore, mechanisms
implementing mutual exclusion are widely used to prevent inconsistencies in VFS
data structures, such as atomic values, mutexes, reader-writer semaphores and spin-
locks. In addition, several global locks are employed to protect the global lists of
data structures while entries are appended or removed. To serve a single system call,
typically multiple locks have to be obtained and released in the right order. Fail-
ing to do so could drive the VFS into a deadlock or an undeﬁned state, eﬀectively
crashing the operating system.
Each speciﬁc ﬁle system, such as EXT3 and ReiserFS, then implements the pro-
cessing supporting the FS and operates on the data structures of the VFS layer. Its
purpose is to provide an interface between the internal view of the FS and physical
media, by translating between the VFS data structures and their on-disk represen-
tations. Finally, the lowest layer contains device drivers which implement access
control for physical media.
The most relevant data structures in the VFS are superblocks, dentries and
inodes. As shown in Fig. 5.1, all of them are linked by various pointers inside
the structures. In addition, the data structures consist of sets of function pointers
that are used to transparently access functionality provided by the underlying FS
implementation. The most frequently used data objects in the VFS are dentries. The
dentry data structures collectively describe the structure of all currently mounted
FSs. Each dentry contains a ﬁle's name, a link to the dentry's parent, the list
of subdirectories and siblings, hard link information, mount information, a link to
the relevant super block and locking structures. It also carries a reference to its
corresponding inode and a reference count that reﬂects the number of processes
currently using the dentry. Dentries are hashed to speed up access; the hashed
dentries are referred to as the Directory Entry Cache, or dcache, which is frequently
consulted when resolving path names.
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In our initial veriﬁcation attempt to the VFS [Galloway et al., 2009], our work
was focused on manually abstracting these data structures and their associated
control ﬂow, so as to obtain a suﬃciently small model for automated veriﬁcation via
model checking. Hence, much eﬀort was put into discovering relations between the
diﬀerent data structures employed by the VFS [Galloway et al., 2009]. The focus of
this chapter diﬀers in the sense that no models of data structures, memory layout or
control ﬂow are derived from the implementation. Instead, each path of the compiled
program is translated automatically into a corresponding constraint system which
is then analysed by an SMT solver, thus fully automating the veriﬁcation process.
5.2 VFS Execution Environment
and Properties
This section discusses our model of the VFS execution environment and also presents
the pointer safety properties and locking API usage rules relevant for the Linux VFS
implementation.
Modelling the environment. One problem for program veriﬁcation arises when
program functions make use of an external data environment, i.e., de-reference point-
ers to data structures that are not created by the function under analysis. This is
particularly common in case of the VFS as the majority of the VFS code operates
on dentries that are assigned either when an FS is mounted or during previous path-
lookup operations. The problem becomes particularly awkward since all these data
structures are organised as linked lists which contain function pointers for accessing
the speciﬁc ﬁle system underlying the VFS layer. This is because symbolic execution
can easily cope with symbolic data objects of which only a pointer to the beginning
of the structure is deﬁned, while the remainder of the structure is left unspeciﬁed.
However, in the case of linked data structures, some unspeciﬁed component of a
given data object may be used as a pointer to another object. Treating the pointer
symbolically will not only result in many false warnings since the pointer may lit-
erally point to any memory location, but may also dramatically increase the search
space.
In our case study we close the VFS system to be analysed by deﬁning a small
number of dentries and associated data structures as static components of the kernel
binary. As far as necessary, these data structures are directly deﬁned in the VFS C
source code by assigning a static task_struct (cf. include/linux/sched.h in the
Linux source hierarchy) deﬁning the logical context, including the working directory
and a list of 15 dentries describing the FS's mount point and a simple directory
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hierarchy. The data objects are partially initialised by a handcrafted function that
is used as a preamble in our analysis process. Note that the actual parameters
to the VFS interface functions and the majority of data ﬁelds in the predeﬁned
data objects are still treated as symbolic values. Our modelling of the external
environment is conducted by successively adding details to the initial memory state
while carefully avoiding being over-restrictive. We only intend to reduce the number
of false warnings by eliminating impossible initial memory states to be considered
in our analysis.
Pointer safety properties. We check three basic safety properties for every
pointer that is de-referenced along an execution path:
1. The pointer does not hold value NULL.
2. The pointer only points to allocated data objects.
3. If the pointer is used as a jump target (call, return or computed jump), it may
only point inside the .text section of the kernel binary, which holds the actual
program code. Obviously, the program binary also has other sections such as
the symbol table or static data which are, however, invalid as jump targets.
A check of the above properties on the IR is performed by computing an over-
approximation of the address range the pointer may point to. That is, we assume
that the pointer may address any memory cell between the maximal and minimal
satisfying model determined by the constraint system for that pointer. For programs
involving only statically assigned data we can directly evaluate the above properties
by checking (a) whether the address range is assigned in the program binary and
(b) whether it belongs to appropriate program sections for the respective use of
the pointer. If dynamic memory allocation is involved, we keep track of objects
and their respective locations currently allocated within the program's constraint
representation. Checking the above properties is then performed as an assertion
check within Yices.
Locking API usage rules. Being designed for a range of multiprocessor plat-
forms, the Linux kernel is inherently concurrent. Hence, it employs various mecha-
nisms implementing mutual exclusion, and primarily locking, to protect concurrently
running kernel threads. The locking APIs used within the VFS are mainly spinlocks
and semaphores, and each of the VFS structures contains pointers to at least one
lock. In addition to these per-object locks, there exist global locks to protect access
to lists of objects.
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At a high level of abstraction, all locking APIs work in a similar fashion. If a
kernel thread attempts to acquire a particular lock, it waits for this lock to become
available, acquires it and performs its critical actions, and then releases the lock.
As a result of this, a thread will wait forever if it attempts to acquire the same
lock twice without releasing it in-between. Checking for the absence of this problem
in single- and multi-threaded programs has recently attracted a lot of attention in
the automated veriﬁcation community [Ball and Rajamani, 2001; Henzinger et al.,
2002a; Witkowski et al., 2007; Xie and Aiken, 2007]. For software systems like
the Linux kernel with its ﬁne grained locking approach, conducting these checks is
non-trivial since locks are passed by reference and due to the vast number of locks
employed. A precise analysis of pointer aliasing relationships would be required to
prove programs to be free of this sort of errors, which is known to be an undecidable
problem in general.
In our approach, locking properties are checked by instrumenting locking related
functions in their IR in such a way that a guarded jump is added to the control ﬂow
of the program, passing control to a designated error location whenever acquiring
an already locked lock structure is attempted or an unlocked lock is released. Our
symbolic analysis is then used to evaluate whether the guard may possibly be true
or not, and an error message for the path is raised if the error location is reachable.
5.3 Applying the SOCA Veriﬁer
to the VFS
For applying the SOCA Veriﬁer to the VFS, we used the VFS implementation of
version 2.6.18.8 of the Linux kernel, compiled with gcc 4.3.3 for the Intel Pentium-
Pro architecture. All conﬁguration options of the kernel were left as defaults. Our
experiments were then carried out on an Intel Core 2 Quad machine with 2.83 GHz
and 4 GBytes of RAM, typically analysing three VFS functions in parallel.
The bounds for the SOCA Veriﬁer were set to a maximum of 1000 paths to be
analysed, where a single program location may appear at most 1000 times per path,
thereby eﬀectively bounding the number of loop iterations or recursions to that
depth. The Yices SMT solver was set to a timeout of 60 seconds per invocation,
which was never reached in our experiments. All these bounds were chosen so that
code coverage is maximised, while execution time is kept reasonably small.
Statistics and performance. Our experimental results are summarised in three
tables. Table 5.1 provides a statistical overview of the VFS code. We report the
total number of machine instructions that have been translated into IR by follow-
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Table 5.1: Experimental Results I: Code statistics by VFS function analysed
creat unlink mkdir rmdir rename totals
no. of instructions 3602 3143 3907 3419 4929 19000
lines in source code 1.4k 1.2k 1.6k 1.4k 2k 7.6k
no. of paths 279 149 212 318 431 1389
min. path length 91 41 87 72 72 41
max. path length 4138 3218 5319 3017 5910 5910
pointer operations 2537 2190 2671 2466 4387 14251
concrete 2356 2134 2458 2368 3989 13305
symbolic 181 56 213 98 398 946
locking operations 287 231 391 319 451 1679
Table 5.2: Experimental Results II: SOCA Veriﬁer statistics
creat unlink mkdir rmdir rename totals
total time 2h27m 1h22m 2h42m 1h34m 3h45m 11h50m
max. memory (SOCA) 1.03G 752M 1.15G 743M 1.41G 1.41G
max. mem. (SOCA+Yices) 1.79G 800M 1.92G 791M 2.18G 2.18G
exec. bound exhausted yes yes yes yes yes yes
path bound exhausted no no no no no no
paths reaching end 154 112 165 215 182 828
assertions checked 13.4k 12.4k 15.8k 11.8k 21.9k 75.3k
ratio of failed checks 0.043 0.012 0.041 0.019 0.049 0.033
ing each function's control ﬂow. The lines in source code give an estimate of the
checked implementation's size as the size of the C functions involved (excluding
type deﬁnitions and header ﬁles, macro deﬁnitions, etc.). The next values in the
table present the numbers of paths and, respectively, the lengths of the shortest and
longest paths, in instructions explored by our veriﬁer with respect to the calling
context of the analysed function. The pointer and locking operations resemble the
numbers of pointer de-references and lock/unlock operations encountered along the
analysed paths, respectively.
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Table 5.3: Experimental Results III: Yices statistics
creat unlink mkdir rmdir rename totals
total Yices calls 27533 21067 31057 20988 44439 145k
total time spent in Yices 2h22m 1h11m 2h22m 1h24m 3h8m 10h28m
average time 311ms 192ms 271ms 198ms 376ms 248ms
standard deviation 3.7s 0.9s 5.2s 1.4s 5.9s 4.8s
max CS size in vars 450k 97k 450k 95k 450k 450k
average CS size in vars 2844 2871 2871 2862 2939 2877
standard deviation 14619 8948 14618 8898 16052 13521
max. memory consumption 766M 48M 766M 48M 766M 766M
In Table 5.2 we report the performance of the SOCA Veriﬁer, showing the total
time needed for analysing the kernel functions and our tool's maximum memory
consumption. The maximum memory consumption of our tool together with the
Yices solver engine is an estimate generated by summing up our tool's and Yices'
maximum memory usage as given in Table 5.3; however, these may not necessarily
hit their peak memory at the same time. The next two rows denote whether the
analysis bounds were reached. We also report the number of paths reaching the end
of the function analysed, the total number of assertions checked and the percentage
of failed checks. Paths not reaching a return statement in the target function are
terminated either due to bound exhaustion, or due to a property being violated that
does not permit continuation of that path.
Finally, we outline in Table 5.3 the usage and behaviour of the SMT solver Yices,
by reporting the number of times Yices was called when checking a particular VFS
function and the total and average time spent for SMT solving. We also give the
size of the checked constraint systems (CS) in boolean variables, as output by Yices
and show the maximum amount of memory used by Yices.
Our analyses usually achieve a statement and condition coverage of 60% to 80%
in this case study.2 The main reason for this, at-ﬁrst-sight low percentage, is that
VFS functions often implement multiple diﬀerent behaviours of which only a few are
reachable for the given execution environment. For example, the implementation
of the creat() system call resides mainly in the open_namei() function alongside
diﬀerent behaviours implementing the open() system call. Taking this into account,
the coverage achieved by the SOCA Veriﬁer is remarkably high when compared to
testing-based approaches.
It should be noted that the above tables can only give a glimpse of the total
scale of experiments that we have conducted for this case study.2 Depending on how
2A complete account of the experiments will be made available on the SOCA website located
at http://swt-bamberg.de/soca/.
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detailed or coarse the execution environment is speciﬁed, we experienced run times
reaching from a few minutes up to several days, achieving diﬀerent levels of statement
and condition coverage (ranging from 20% to 80%) and diﬀerent error ratios (ranging
from 0 to 0.5). The discriminating value in all these experiments is the total number
of symbolic pointers; a symbolic pointer is a pointer where the exact value cannot
be determined at the point at which it is de-referenced. This usually happens when
the entire pointer or some component of it (e.g., its base or oﬀset) is retrieved from
an incompletely speciﬁed component of the execution environment or directly from
the input to the analysed function. While these symbolic values are generally bad
for the performance of the SOCA technique since slicing is rendered ineﬃcient and
search spaces are increased, they are important for driving the analysis into paths
that may be hard to reach in testing-based approaches to system validation.
Errors and false positives. As our veriﬁcation technique does not include in-
feasible paths, all errors detected by the SOCA Veriﬁer can actually be reproduced
in the code, provided that other kernel components match the behaviour of our
employed execution environment.
In advance of the experiments reported in this chapter, we had tested our imple-
mentation of the SOCA technique on a variety of hand-crafted examples and also
on the Verisec suite [Ku et al., 2007] which provides 280 examples of buﬀer overﬂow
vulnerabilities taken from application programs. In all these cases we experienced
low false-positive rates of less than 20%. However, as these examples represent
closed systems not using external data objects, they are handled more eﬃciently by
the SOCA Veriﬁer than the VFS which makes heavy use of external data objects.
Our above result tables show that our analysis approach detects a number of
errors of about 3% of the total number of checked assertions in each VFS function
analysed. We have inspected each reported error in detail and discovered that all
of them are due to an imprecisely speciﬁed execution environment. As explained in
the previous section, specifying a valid but non-restrictive environment is particu-
larly hard as all VFS functions operate on data structures that are allocated and
assigned by other kernel sub-systems before the VFS functions are executed. As
most of these structures form multiple lists, modelling them manually is tedious and
error-prone. Therefore, our strategy was to leave many ﬁelds of those structures
initially unspeciﬁed and successively add as much detail as necessary to eliminate
false positives. This proved to be a good way to specify valid and at the same time
non-restrictive execution environments.
Not having discovered any real errors in the analysed VFS code contributes to
our high conﬁdence in the Linux kernel and is to be expected; the VFS consists of
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a well established and extensively used and tested code base, which is under active
development for many years. Indeed, our primary goal when setting up this case
study was not to ﬁnd errors in the VFS code but to use the VFS as a complex,
real-world veriﬁcation project for stress-testing our SOCA Veriﬁer. With respect
to this task, our results demonstrate that the SOCA Veriﬁer is capable of reliably
and eﬃciently analysing the complex Linux VFS implementation on oﬀ-the-shelf
hardware.
5.4 Evaluating the Eﬀectiveness of SOCA
With the goal of further evaluating the eﬀectiveness of SOCA as a bug-ﬁnding tool,
we conduct a second case study which applies our SOCA Veriﬁer to consecutive
releases of the Linux kernel's VFS implementation. With its publicly available
source code, well documented bug reports and patches, and a release history reaching
back for almost 20 years, the Linux kernel is an ideal candidate for the sort of
archaeological study presented here. The question which we pursue is: If the
Linux developers would have had the SOCA Veriﬁer available, what ratio of newly
introduced bugs could have been detected automatically, and hence, could have been
ﬁxed immediately?
5.4.1 Choice of VFS versions
For this case study we chose to analyse 23 patches committed to the current stable
2.6 development branch of the Linux kernel. The source repository3 contains all
contributions committed to Linux 2.6 between April 2005 (Linux 2.6.12-rc2) and
February 2010 (Linux 2.6.33-rc7). Our selection is made by choosing all commits
aﬀecting the VFS and in which null-pointer issues are addressed, according to the
documentation of the patch. Due to the previously explained high complexity of
the VFS, involving linked data structures and computed jumps, restricting this case
study to null-pointers does not render the study trivial. The subject matter of the 23
patches considered here varies from actual bug ﬁxes, to performance enhancements,
to the implementation of new features. Hence, the patches diﬀer substantially in
size, ranging from a few lines of code modiﬁcations in one ﬁle, up to 300 lines of code
modiﬁcations that are distributed over several ﬁles and changing data structures and
function interfaces. An overview of our sample is given in Table 5.4. The commit
keys given in the table are references to Linux's source code repository.
3The source repository of Linux 2.6 is available at http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/
git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git.
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5.4.2 Case study setup
To conduct our case study we compile two versions of the Linux kernel for each of
the 23 patches. More precisely, we compile one kernel binary using the source code
directly before a patch was committed, and a second binary from the sources that
include the patch. In all cases is the kernel source conﬁgured for the IA32 archi-
tecture using the default conﬁguration shipped with the kernel sources. The SOCA
Veriﬁer is then applied to the functions aﬀected by a particular patch in each of the
two kernel binaries compiled with respect to that patch. In diﬀerence to the ﬁrst
case study presented in Sec. 5.3, SOCA is applied here without modelling an execu-
tion environment for the functions checked. The modelling step has been omitted
due to the large number of functions and kernels to be analysed, and especially due
to the changes in function interfaces and the kernel's data structures between these
releases. The bounds for the SOCA Veriﬁer are set to the values used in the previous
case study. The error traces reported by our tool are manually checked for validity,
i.e., whether the expected error has been found or whether traces not related to the
subject matter of the patch or false-positive traces are reported.
A detailed account of the results of the case study is given in Table 5.4. When
analysing a patch that is supposed to ﬁx a bug, we expect the SOCA Veriﬁer to
report an error trace for that bug in the kernel binary compiled from the pre-
patched source, and also to report the patched version of the kernel to be free of
that bug. We denote this success case with a + in the Results column of Table 5.4.
With +/+ and −/+ we denote that the error was detected in the pre-patched kernel
but also in the patched kernel, or that the error was only reported for the patched
kernel, respectively. We write −/− if no error was detected at all. For patches
introducing new features or implementing performance improvements we expect the
pre-patched kernel and the patched kernel to be free of errors and denote that with
0 in Table 5.4. If SOCA issues false-positive errors for these cases, we write pre/post,
where pre and post denote the numbers of false-positive errors raised for the pre-
patched kernel and the patched kernel, respectively. If error traces that are not
related to the patch under consideration, are produced by the SOCA Veriﬁer, we
give the number of those reported error traces in column Unrelated Traces. Table 5.4
contains seven cases where the kernel source failed to compile for the pre-patched
kernel, the patched kernel, or both. Obviously, SOCA could not be applied to these
kernels.
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Table 5.4: Experimental Results IV: Evaluating the eﬀectiveness of SOCA
No. of Unrelated
# Commit Key Type Functions Results Traces
1 08ce5f16ee466ffc5bf243800deeecd77d9eaf50 F 2 0 2
2 214fda1f6e1b8ef2a5292b0372744037fc80d318 P 2 does not compile
3 22d2b35b200f76085c16a2e14ca30b58510fcbe7 F 1 does not compile
4 2a737871108de9ba8930f7650d549f1383767f8b BF 5 +, 0 1
5 2f38d70fb4e97e7d00e12eaac45790cf6ebd7b22 P 4 0 0
6 322ee5b36eac42e762526b0df7fa432beba6e7a0 B 1 + 2
7 4a19542e5f694cd408a32c3d9dc593ba9366e2d7 F 1 does not compile
8 4ea3ada2955e4519befa98ff55dd62d6dfbd1705 BP 3 +/+, 2/1 0
9 520c85346666d4d9a6fcaaa8450542302dc28b91 BP 2 +, 0/2 3
10 6c5daf012c9155aafd2c7973e4278766c30dfad0 BP 2 +, 0/2 1
11 6ea36ddbd1abfe867f1e874a8312bfd811e5fd2c P 1 does not compile
12 73241ccca0f7786933f1d31b3d86f2456549953a FP 5 does not compile
13 745ca2475a6ac596e3d8d37c2759c0fbe2586227 B 1 0 1
14 7ed7fe5e82c9fc8473974fbd7389d169b8f17c77 BP 1 +, 0 2
15 acb0c854fa9483fa85e377b9f342352ea814a580 P 3
16 acd0c935178649f72c44ec49ca83bee35ce1f79e B 2 + 1
17 acfa4380efe77e290d3a96b11cd4c9f24f4fbb18 P 4 0/3 0
18 ad775f5a8faa5845377f093ca11caf577404add9 B 2 −/− 3
19 cb59861f03a626196a23fdef5e20ddbb8cca6466 P 1 0/1 0
20 cdb70f3f74b31576cc4d707a3d3b00d159cab8bb P 1 0/1 2
21 d0185c0882d76b8126d4a099c7ac82b3b216d103 B 2 + 1
22 e0e817392b9acf2c98d3be80c233dddb1b52003d B 1 + 2
23 e6c6e640b8b258dc7f60533e81f050d15fc0a9af P 1 does not compile
Commit Key: A patch referenced by <commitkey> can be viewed at
http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/
linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=<commitkey>.
Type: B  bug ﬁxed; F  feature introduced; P  performance improved
5.4.3 Results
The most important result of this case study relates to the patches labelled as bug
ﬁxes. The SOCA Veriﬁer reliably reports 8 out of 10 of the pre-patched kernels as
buggy and the corresponding 8 patched kernels as safe. This means that 80% of
the total number of null-pointer bugs ﬁxed in these kernel releases were successfully
detected by the SOCA Veriﬁer.
In a similar way, SOCA reports 5 of the 11 performance improvements and
feature introductions as safe (45.5%), which is to be expected when considering
the extensive amount of peer-review done for each patch submission by the kernel's
developers. Especially for the patches implementing performance improvements, the
SOCA Veriﬁer reports a number of false-positive error traces on the patched kernels.
This result can be explained when looking at the code modiﬁcations introduced by
these patches: most of them remove superﬂuous pointer checks from the code.
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This means, the kernel's developers consider these checks as redundant because
the patched functions will never be called with certain types of invalid parameters.
However, since we check these functions in isolation, i.e., without considering all
possible calling contexts, we cannot verify that an invalid pointer is never used as
an argument to the function, and hence report a potentially error trace.
The experiments conducted here consumed a total of 41.71 hours of CPU time
on an exclusively used Intel Xeon 8-core PC with 2.6 GHz per core and 12 GBytes of
memory. Of this time 9.67 hours were used for sequentially compiling 32 Linux kernel
binaries. The remaining 32 CPU hours were consumed by the SOCA Veriﬁer for
checking a total of 68 functions, which was done by invoking seven SOCA processes
in parallel. The memory consumption of the SOCA processes always stayed below
2 GBytes per process. Hence, the SOCA Veriﬁer can be used on a modern oﬀ-
the-shelf PC without limitations. By exploiting the parallel machine architecture
we have available, the actual veriﬁcation was conducted within less than 6 hours.
These ﬁgures show that the SOCA technique can be very well applied as a unit-level
bug-ﬁnding tool during software development in large projects. The eﬀective time
needed for verifying the small set of components usually modiﬁed within a single
commit is typically shorter than the time the developer has to wait for compiling
the project.
5.5 Related Work on File System Veriﬁcation
The veriﬁcation of ﬁle system implementations is studied in [Butterﬁeld and Catháin,
2009; Damchoom and Butler, 2009; Ferreira and Oliveira, 2009; Galloway et al., 2009;
Kim and Kim, 2009; Yang et al., 2006, 2004]. In [Yang et al., 2004], model checking
is used within the systematic testing of EXT3, JFS and ReiserFS. The employed
veriﬁcation system consists of an explicit-state model checker running the Linux ker-
nel, a ﬁle system test driver, a permutation checker that veriﬁes that a ﬁle system
can always recover, and a recovery checker using the fsck recovery tool. The veriﬁ-
cation system starts with an empty ﬁle system and recursively generates successive
states by executing system calls aﬀecting the ﬁle system under analysis. After each
step, the veriﬁcation system is interrupted, and fsck is used to check whether the
ﬁle system can recover to a valid state. In contrast to this, our work focuses on
checking a diﬀerent class of properties, namely pointer safety and locking proper-
ties. Thanks to our SOCA technique we can analyse these properties precisely and
feed back detailed error traces together with speciﬁc initial heap state information
leading to the error.
In [Kim and Kim, 2009] an empirical study applying concolic testing [Sen et al.,
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2005] to the multi-sector read operation of a ﬂash memory implementation is pre-
sented. Concolic testing relies on performing concrete execution on random inputs
while collecting path constraints along executed paths. The constraints are then used
to compute new inputs driving the program along alternative paths. In diﬀerence
to this approach, SOCA uses symbolic execution to explore all paths and concre-
tises only in order to resolve computed jumps. Concrete execution in SOCA may
also be employed to set up the environment for symbolic execution. [Kim and Kim,
2009] discusses the advantages and weaknesses of concolic testing on the domain of
low-level ﬁle system veriﬁcation as compared to model checking. The authors con-
clude that their approach achieved several experimental goals, namely automated
test case generation, high code coverage and the detection of bugs, but suﬀers from
limitations including the low speed of the analysis and the lack of support for array
index variables in their tool chain.
A model in the process algebra CSP that covers the concurrent aspects of ﬂash
memory is described in [Butterﬁeld and Catháin, 2009]. The authors focused on
developing a low-level model covering the internal behaviour of Open NAND ﬂash
devices. They Apply the FDR model checker to prove the consistency of this model
with a speciﬁcation of the external interface of the device. While the authors de-
tected several deadlocks and sources of missinterpretation in the models, the analysis
could only be partially completed as the speciﬁcations proved to be too complex for
being analysed with FDR in full.
In [Damchoom and Butler, 2009] a model of a ﬂash-based ﬁle store developed
in Event-B is given. In this paper, the authors centre on discussing their use of
reﬁnement in feature augmentation and as structural reﬁnement. The goal of their
work is to simplify the process of model construction and to relate an abstract ﬁle
system model with the ﬂash speciﬁcation. The paper explains further, how machine
decomposition can be applied to separate parts of the ﬁle system layer from the
interface layer in a complex ﬁle system model.
Finally, the application of theorem proving techniques to build a formal methods
tool chain and apply it to an abstract ﬁle system model is presented in [Ferreira and
Oliveira, 2009]. The paper shows how diﬀerent formal methods and tools, including
Alloy, VDM++ and HOL may be glued together by relation modelling. It also
advocates transparent integration and automation of formal methods in software
development processes.
Chapter 6
Summary and Conclusions
This thesis focusses on identifying pointer safety related errors in computer pro-
grams. We make ﬁve contributions in this area:
Blasting Linux Code. In Chapter 3, we present a case study on the software
model checker Blast. We exposed Blast to analysing 16 diﬀerent operating sys-
tem code examples of programming errors related to memory safety and locking
behaviour. In our experience, Blast is rather diﬃcult to apply by a practitioner
during operating system software development. This is because of (i) its limita-
tions with respect to reasoning about pointers, (ii) several issues regarding usability,
including bugs in within the program itself, and (iii) a lack of consistent documen-
tation. Especially in the case of memory safety properties, massive changes to the
source code were necessary which essentially requires one to know about a bug be-
forehand. However, it must be mentioned that Blast was not designed as a memory
debugger. Indeed, Blast performed considerably better during our tests with lock-
ing properties; however, modiﬁcations on the source code were still necessary in
most cases.
Symbolic Object Code Analysis. Our second contribution, given in Chapter 4,
is in introducing Symbolic Object Code Analysis, a technique for verifying pointer
safety properties by bounded symbolic execution of compiled programs. More pre-
cisely, the SOCA technique (i) systematically traverses the object code in a depth-
ﬁrst fashion up to a certain depth and width, (ii) calculates at each assembly in-
struction a slice required for checking the relevant pointer-safety properties at this
instruction, (iii) translates the slice and properties into a bit-vector constraint prob-
lem, and (iv) executes the checks by invoking the Yices SMT solver.
Evaluation of SOCA. Our third contribution, also in Chapter 4, is in introducing
the SOCA Veriﬁer as a prototypical implementation of the SOCA technique. By
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means of extensive experimental results of the SOCA Veriﬁer, using the Verisec suite
and almost 10,000 Linux device driver functions as benchmarks, we show not only
that SOCA performs competitively to current source-code model checkers but that
it also scales well when applied to real operating systems code and pointer safety
issues. SOCA eﬀectively explores semantic niches of software that current software
veriﬁers do not reach.
Beyond Memory Safety: VFS. Our fourth contribution is given in an further
case study applying the SOCA technique to the Linux Virtual File System (VFS)
in Chapter 5. We demonstrate how complex veriﬁcation properties including in-
formation on heap-allocated data structures as well as pre- and post conditions of
functions, can be expressed for symbolic object-code analysis, for which two diﬀerent
approaches are employed. Firstly, properties may be presented to the SMT solver as
assertions on the program's register contents at each execution point. Alternatively,
the program may be instrumented during its symbolic execution, by adding test and
branch instructions to its control ﬂow graph. Verifying a particular property then
involves checking for the reachability of a speciﬁc code section. While the ﬁrst ap-
proach allows us to express safety properties on pointers, we use the latter technique
for checking preconditions of kernel API functions reﬂecting particular API usage
rules.
Eﬀectiveness of SOCA. Our ﬁfth contribution is in providing evidence for the
eﬀectiveness and reliability of the SOCA technique by conducting an archaeological
case study on the Linux VFS in Chapter 5. We apply the SOCA Veriﬁer to VFS
functions obtained from 32 releases of the Linux kernel, showing that up to 80% of
null-pointer related bugs ﬁxed between these releases can be detected automatically.
We demonstrate further that the SOCA Veriﬁer can be applied as an eﬃcient, unit-
level bug-ﬁnding tool since the eﬀective time needed for verifying the set of software
components modiﬁed between two releases is typically shorter than the time needed
for compiling the project. Therefore, adding automated software veriﬁcation to the
tool set of kernel software developers promises to signiﬁcantly improve the quality
assurance process for operating system kernels.
Veriﬁcation of the VFS. Our last, but not least, contribution is the formal
veriﬁcation of a group of commonly used VFS functions, namely those for creating
and removing ﬁles and directories. By applying symbolic execution and leaving
the parameters of these functions as unspeciﬁed as possible, our analysis covers
low-probability scenarios. In particular, we look for program points where pointers
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holding invalid values may be de-referenced or where the violation of API usage
rules may cause the VFS to deadlock. The experimental results show that the
SOCA technique works well on the Linux VFS and that it produces a relatively
low number of false-positive counterexamples while achieving high code coverage.
Therefore, the absence of any ﬂagged errors contributes to raising conﬁdence in the
correctness of the Linux VFS implementation.
6.1 Conclusions
The initial motivation for our SOCA technique to automated program veriﬁcation
was to explore the feasibility of using symbolic execution for analysing compiled
programs with respect to pointer safety properties. Indeed, object-code analysis is
the method of choice for dealing with programs written in a combination of pro-
gramming languages such as C and inlined assembly. This is particularly true for
operating system code which is often highly platform speciﬁc and makes extensive
use of programming constructs such as function pointers. As we show in this chap-
ter, these constructs can be dealt with eﬃciently in path-wise symbolic object-code
analysis, while they are usually ignored by static techniques or by source-code-based
approaches.
While the ideas behind the SOCA technique, namely symbolic execution, path-
sensitive slicing and SMT solving, are well-known, the way in which these are in-
tegrated into the SOCA Veriﬁer is novel. Much engineering eﬀort went also into
our SOCA implementation so that it scales to complex real-world operating system
code such as the Linux device drivers analysed in this paper.
The main reasons for this scalability are in the structure of programs in the
application domain of Linux device drivers as well as in the proceeding followed by
the SOCA technique. Firstly, device drivers are relatively small programs consisting
of generally short functions with small data spaces, rendering a search-based anal-
ysis possible. We expect our technique to be applicable for large-scale application
software. However, this may require major adaption, probably including the use
of program abstraction. Hence, doing so may result in having to deal with diﬀer-
ent classes of false-positive results. Currently a valid counterexample-trace can be
produced for each violation of a safety property. That means, our technique issues
false-positive error reports only due to imprecisely deﬁned initial memory states or
function parameters that are not to be expected in real program execution.
Secondly, our choice of path-wise analysing compiled code contributes a great
deal to the results presented above. That is because having a program represen-
tation with explicit memory access operations and exploring each path separately
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in a symbolic execution setting turned out to be suﬃcient for eﬃciently handling
a majority of pointer aliasing problems and computed jumps, other approaches are
not able to cope well with.
6.2 Open Issues and Future Work
There are several open issues to be addressed in future work. The most pressing
problem is to gain the ability of automatically dealing with device drivers with large
data spaces and drivers that make use of complex, pointered data structures as their
input. In Chapter 5 we show that in general, constraints on the driver's input can be
easily prepended to the constraint systems and may even be considered by the slicer.
However, this has to be done manually. Extracting the required information from
the binary or from the public C header ﬁles describing the interface implemented by
the driver, remains an open problem. Knowing whether the input is supposed to be
a cyclic list or a tree and at which oﬀsets pointers are supposed to be would reduce
the number of false-positive errors found by our approach substantially. We think
that current work on shape analysis [Calcagno et al., 2009], [Yang et al., 2007] may
provide results that can be integrated into our tool.
Another important and probably quickly achievable goal is to provide debugger
integration for our tool in such a way that analysis results can be presented as an
error trace in a program debugger, together with an program input that would lead
to a segmentation fault or similar when the program is executed.
We are also aiming too parallelising our analysis approach in order to beneﬁt from
currently available multi-CPU and multi-core PCs. This should be relatively easy
to achieve as constraint generation and constraint solving are already performed in
separated processes, and the constraint generation is much faster than the solving.
Hence, multiple paths could be explored by one constraint generating process while
several instances of the SMT solver are employed to boost analysis performance.
The probably biggest challenge is in regard of handling concurrency in the driver
to be analysed. Device drivers run in a highly concurrent environment in which their
interface functions may be invoked from multiple concurrently executing application
programs. Hence, computer architectures supporting symmetric multi-processing,
as well as normal process preemption caused by scheduling on single processor ma-
chines, gives rise to the indeterminate sequencing of the respective threads. There-
fore, mechanisms implementing mutual exclusion are widely used in order to prevent
inconsistencies arising in this context. Our approach currently ignores all memory
safety issues arising from interleaved writing to the heap and much more research
is required in this area. We believe that techniques such as partial order reduction
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[Godefroid, 1994], [Flanagan and Godefroid, 2005] may constitute a way to deal
with the potentially inﬁnitely large number of possible interleavings that have to be
considered in a concurrent symbolic execution setting.
Last but not least, the work presented within this thesis has not revealed a
previously unknown error in an operating system component. Although we know
from our experiments with the Verisec suite that our technique produces relatively
few false positives, we have no indication regarding the false-positive rate in the
device driver benchmark presented in Section 4.5.3. We have detected 887 program
locations at which potential null-pointers may be dereferenced. While we have not
checked whether those are real errors or whether they are the result of a too loosely
speciﬁed execution environment, our second case study on the Linux VFS in Sec. 5.4
gives an indication on SOCA's eﬀectiveness as a bug-ﬁnding tool. To substantiate
this, future research should also aim at extending the SOCA Veriﬁer to support,
i.e., properties related to real-time components of operating system kernels kernels,
for which additional case studies would be required. A particularly worthwhile
project would be another archaeological study in the spirit of the one conducted
in Sec. 5.4 on projects like FreeRTOS [Barry, 2010] or implementations of ﬂash ﬁle
systems [Hynix Semiconductor et al., 2008]: tracing that code's development line
over several releases and checking whether timing-related and scheduling-related
errors that were introduced or removed in subsequent releases can be found by
SOCA, could give a clear indication on the applicability of the SOCA technique in
the area of embedded and real-time systems.
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